

U4 HELPDESK ANSWER 2026:12

Côte d'Ivoire: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption

Miloš Resimić

Reviewed by

Caitlin Maslen and Samuel Kaninda (TI)

Social Justice (Cote d'Ivoire)

Guillaume Nicaise (U4)

Since the end of the 2010-2011 post-electoral conflict, Côte d'Ivoire has achieved political stabilisation, rapid economic growth and notable improvements in its formal anti-corruption framework. However, progress has been uneven, and international governance indicators and public-opinion and enterprise surveys continue to identify significant corruption concerns. Bribery ranges from informal payments for routine services to schemes intended to secure regulatory or commercial advantages, while embezzlement involves officials at different levels, including senior officeholders and managers of public service entities. Across the sectors examined, including police, tax and customs administration, judiciary and public procurement, corruption is enabled by official discretion, weak oversight, political interference and limited transparency.

U4 Helpdesk Answers are tailor-made research briefings compiled in ten working days. The U4 Helpdesk is a free research service run in collaboration with Transparency International.

helpdesk@u4.no

How to cite

Resimić, M. 2026. Côte d'Ivoire: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. Bergen: Transparency International and U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2026)

Published

September 2026

Keywords

Côte d'Ivoire – West Africa – bribery – embezzlement – customs and tax administration – police – judiciary – public procurement

Related U4 reading

[Cote d'Ivoire: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption \(2016\)](#)

[Benin: Corruption and anti-corruption \(2026\)](#)

Query

Please provide an overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Côte d'Ivoire with a focus on the police, judiciary, tax and customs administrations and public procurement.

Main points

- Since the end of the 2010-2011 conflict, Côte d'Ivoire has achieved substantial political stabilisation and rapid economic growth, supported by large infrastructure investments, economic reforms and increased foreign investment. It has also strengthened its formal governance framework through new anti-corruption institutions, legislation and strategies.
- While the country has avoided renewed large-scale conflict and relaxed some exclusionary citizenship rules, the concentration of power under the president, the exclusion of leading opposition candidates and the governing party's electoral dominance have increasingly restricted meaningful political competition.
- A substantial gap persists between formal reforms and their enforcement. Relatively few corruption allegations, particularly those involving senior or politically connected figures, result in prosecution or sanctions, while perceptions of selective enforcement, fear of retaliation and doubts that authorities will act continue to undermine public confidence in anti-corruption institutions.
- Available international indices indicate overall progress in controlling corruption, although improvements have been uneven. At the same time, public-opinion and business surveys continue to reveal widespread perceptions of institutional corruption, limited confidence in reporting mechanisms and serious concerns about the impact of corruption on the business environment.
- Bribery in Côte d'Ivoire affects interactions between citizens, businesses and public officials across numerous sectors, ranging from informal payments for routine services to larger schemes intended to obtain regulatory or commercial advantages.
- The embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources in Côte d'Ivoire involve officials at different levels, including senior officeholders and managers of public entities, although the political sensitivity of some prosecutions has raised concerns about selective and politicised enforcement.
- In the police and security sector in Côte d'Ivoire, corruption ranges from routine extortion at checkpoints to organised misconduct involving illicit markets and the diversion of seized goods, with evidence suggesting hierarchical pressure and uneven accountability for senior officers.
- In the customs and tax administration in Côte d'Ivoire, corruption risks arise in routine encounters with businesses as well as through more complex manipulation of customs clearance, cross-border trade and tax-relief procedures, while limited transparency about investigations weakens accountability.
- Judicial corruption risks in Côte d'Ivoire include informal payments, susceptibility

to bribery and political interference, selective enforcement and limited transparency surrounding investigations and judgements, all of which undermine public confidence in the country's justice system.

- Despite reforms to the procurement framework which have strengthened the regulatory and institutional framework, non-competitive procedures, official discretion, overlapping institutional responsibilities and inadequate oversight continue to create opportunities for favouritism, corruption and the misuse of public funds in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Côte d'Ivoire has developed an extensive anti-corruption framework comprising specialised laws, oversight bodies, investigative institutions, reporting platforms and financial crime agencies. However, its effectiveness is constrained by limited institutional independence of HABG and ARCOP and resources, weak coordination and inconsistent follow-up on investigations, audit findings and recommendations. The effectiveness of the system could be enhanced through better coordination among relevant institutions, strengthening of their capacity and resources, clarification of responsibilities and more systematic follow-up on the outcomes of investigations and audits.


Contents

Background	6
Extent of corruption	11
Forms of corruption	14
Bribery	14
Embezzlement	15
Main sectors affected by corruption	18
Police and the broader security sector	18
Customs and tax administration	19
Judiciary	21
Public procurement	23
Legal and institutional anti-corruption framework	26
International conventions and initiatives	26
Domestic legal framework	27
Institutional framework	28
Other stakeholders	33
References	36

Background

Côte d'Ivoire, the world's largest producer of cocoa and cashew, is a coastal West African Country, bordering Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana (Figure 1). It has a population of approximately 32.7 million (World Bank n.d. a, n.d. b).

Figure 1: Map of Côte d'Ivoire and neighbouring countries.



Source: Mundt et al. 2026.

Since the end of the 2010-2011 post-election conflict and Alassane Ouattara's assumption of the presidency in 2011, Côte d'Ivoire has achieved notable progress in political stabilisation (BTI 2026; World Bank n.d. b). The state re-established control over most of its territory, security improved and the country avoided a return to large-scale armed conflict, although important sources of political tension and insecurity remain (Freedom House 2026; International Crisis Group 2025; BTI 2026). Some of the exclusionary citizenship rules associated with earlier conflicts were also relaxed. In particular, the 2016 constitution removed the requirement that both parents of a presidential candidate be Ivorian by birth, requiring instead that one parent be Ivorian (Freedom House 2018), reflecting an evolution in the framework governing political participation and inclusion.

The country has simultaneously undergone a significant economic transformation. The annual growth rate between 2012-2019 was 9.2%, and 6.5% between 2021-2024, putting it among Africa's top four fastest growing economies (Swinkels et al. 2026). The government has invested heavily in transport, energy and other infrastructure. It has also sought to broaden the productive base beyond the export of raw cocoa and cashew nuts, by encouraging private investment in manufacturing and promoting and expanding domestic processing of agricultural commodities, to reduce its dependence on exports of unprocessed agricultural commodities (World Bank n.d. b; Dyer 2025; IMF 2025). These reforms have helped attract substantial foreign direct investment and consolidate the country's position as a regional economic hub (World Bank n.d. b; Dyer 2025).

These developments are part of a historical trajectory marked by several periods of political and economic transformation. Upon accession to independence in 1960, Félix Houphouët-Boigny governed Côte d'Ivoire through an authoritarian one party system dominated by the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (Parti démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire - PDCI), while maintaining an open, export oriented economy (BTI 2026; Britannica Editors n.d.). Economic contraction and growing social discontent contributed to the introduction of multiparty politics in 1990, followed by an increasingly contentious succession struggle after Houphouët-Boigny's death in 1993 (BTI 2026).

His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, promoted the exclusionary concept of Ivoirité, concept that has been used to challenge the nationality of many inhabitants of the North and people of immigrant origin and to prevent Alassane Ouattara from contesting the 1995 presidential election (BTI 2026). Bédié's removal in a 1999 military coup was followed by Laurent Gbagbo's disputed election in 2000 and a rebellion in 2002 that divided the country between the government controlled south and the rebel held north. The 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement established a power sharing arrangement under which the rebel leader Guillaume Soro became prime minister and created the conditions for presidential elections in 2010 (BTI 2026; International Crisis Group 2015; University of Notre Dame n.d.).

The 2010 election produced a renewed conflict after both Gbagbo and Ouattara claimed victory and Gbagbo refused to accept Ouattara's internationally recognised win (Freedom House 2017; BTI 2026). In the ensuing violence, approximately 3,000 people died and around 1 million were displaced (Freedom House 2017). Forces supporting Ouattara, assisted by French and United Nations troops, defeated Gbagbo's forces in 2011, after which Ouattara assumed the presidency (Freedom House 2017; Dyer 2025). He was subsequently re-elected in 2015, 2020 and 2025.

This history continues to shape the main political actors and divisions today. Ouattara's Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace (Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes

pour la Démocratie et la Paix - RHDP), originally an electoral alliance that included the PDCI and Ouattara's Rally of the Republicans, has become the dominant governing party (Krippahl 2020). The PDCI later left the alliance and returned to opposition, selecting former government minister and international banker Tidjane Thiam as its presidential candidate in 2025 (Mackintosh 2025). Gbagbo, meanwhile, established the African People's Party - Côte d'Ivoire (Parti des Peuples Africains - Côte d'Ivoire - PPA-CI) in 2021 after returning from proceedings at the International Criminal Court (BBC 2019; Coulibaly 2021). Guillaume Soro, once Ouattara's ally and prime minister, subsequently broke with the president and remained outside the country after his conviction by an Ivorian court (AlJazeera 2021; BBC 2020).

The 2016 constitution, amended in 2020, maintained Côte d'Ivoire's presidential system and formally limited presidents to two terms (Tasci 2020). However, the constitutional council ruled that the adoption of the new constitution had reset the term count, allowing Ouattara to seek what was chronologically his third term in 2020 and his fourth in 2025 (Tasci 2020; International Crisis Group 2020; Mundt et al. 2026). This interpretation, together with the exclusion of leading opposition figures, has raised continuing concerns about the fairness of political competition (Tasci 2020; BTI 2026).

These concerns were particularly evident during the October 2025 presidential election. The constitutional council approved only five of the 60 submitted candidacies (IRI 2025). Those excluded included Gbagbo and Thiam, the leaders of two of the largest opposition parties (Reuters 2025). Gbagbo remained ineligible because of an earlier criminal conviction, while a court removed Thiam from the electoral register on the grounds that he had held French citizenship, notwithstanding his renunciation of that citizenship before the election (International IDEA 2026; France24 2025; Reuters 2025). The decision against Thiam was not subject to appeal. Opposition parties described these exclusions as politically motivated, while international and domestic observers raised broader concerns about restrictiveness of the electoral environment (Reuters 2025; International Crisis Group 2025).

With the main opposition challengers excluded from the ballot, Ouattara won almost 90% of the vote in 2025, securing a fourth term, while the ruling RHDP subsequently captured 197 of the national assembly's 255 seats (Sylvestre-Treiner 2025; International IDEA 2025). The PPA-CI boycotted the parliamentary elections, citing the exclusion of opposition leaders and the absence of credible electoral competition (International IDEA 2025). The use of judicial and administrative decisions to exclude credible challengers does not by itself demonstrate direct executive control over individual rulings.

The economic record is mixed. Recent growth has relied heavily on increases in capital and labour rather than improvements in productivity, innovation and efficiency (Swinkels et al. 2026). Moreover, economic expansion has not translated into commensurate reductions in poverty: between 2018 and 2021, the rate at which growth reduced poverty was well below African and global averages (Swinkels et al. 2026). Although the tax-to-GDP ratio increased from 11.9% in 2019 to approximately 14% in 2024, it remains well below the 20% target established by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (World Bank 2025a). Continued dependence on cocoa and other agricultural commodities also leaves the economy exposed to price fluctuations and the effects of climate change (IMF 2025).

Côte d'Ivoire has nevertheless made progress in developing its formal anti-corruption framework. The government established the High Authority for Good Governance (Haute Autorité Pour la Bonne Gouvernance - HABG), adopted new anti-corruption legislation and joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2015 (OGP 2025a). In 2024, it adopted its first national anti-corruption strategy, covering 2024 to 2028 and setting out 54 measures in five priority areas: reforming the legal framework, strengthening controls, improving public administration, consolidating anti-corruption bodies and involving citizens (OGP 2025a). Other (ongoing) initiatives have included a simplified citizen's budget, steps towards digitising the asset declaration system and digital and telephone channels through which citizens can report corruption anonymously (OGP 2025a).

These reforms may have contributed to improvements in international governance indicators. Côte d'Ivoire's score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) rose from 29 out of 100 in 2012 to 45 in 2024. However, it declined to 43 in 2025, indicating that progress has been uneven and may be vulnerable to reversal (Transparency International 2026a; see also Freedom House 2026; World Bank 2025a).

Moreover, a significant gap persists between the adoption of institutions and rules and their effective enforcement. Despite credible allegations of widespread corruption, relatively few cases have resulted in prosecutions or convictions, particularly where prominent political or administrative figures are involved (IMF 2023; US Department of State 2026). As discussed in the remainder of this Helpdesk Answer, enforcement appears to concentrate predominantly on lower level officials. Some cases involving senior opposition linked figures have also generated allegations that criminal and anti-corruption proceedings are being applied selectively to remove or weaken political rivals (APA 2019; Caballero 2020; Abidjan.net 2023; N'Guessan 2023). Public confidence in reporting and enforcement also remains limited. In an Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2016-2017, 68% of respondents believed that reporting corruption could expose citizens to retaliation or other adverse

consequences, while 53% considered it unlikely that the authorities would respond (Ségorbah Silwé and Koné 2017).

The government has itself acknowledged the economic scale of the problem. In 2022, Zoro Épiphanie Ballo, then minister responsible for good governance and measures to counter corruption, reportedly estimated that corruption cost Côte d'Ivoire CFAF 1.3 trillion annually, equivalent to approximately 4% of GDP and almost three times the volume of official development assistance received by the country (CCESP 2022).


Against this background, this Helpdesk Answer examines the principal forms and drivers of corruption in Côte d'Ivoire and assesses corruption risks in four particularly exposed sectors: the police, tax and customs administration, the judiciary and public procurement.

Extent of corruption

A recent assessment by Amnesty International (2024: 1) highlights the systemic nature of corruption in Côte d'Ivoire. Despite the anti-corruption measures introduced over the preceding decade, as discussed in the introduction, corruption reportedly persists across all sectors of the economy and society (Amnesty International 2024).

According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2025, Côte d'Ivoire scored 43/100 and ranked 76 among 182 countries and territories (Transparency International 2026a). The country's CPI score improved in recent years, particularly between 2021 and 2024, but fell by two points between 2024 and 2025 (Transparency International 2026a, 2026b) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: CPI for Côte d'Ivoire between 2012-2025.



Source: Transparency International 2026a.

Freedom House's (2026) Freedom in the World 2026 report, which assesses developments during 2025, continues to classify Côte d'Ivoire as "partly free". The country received a score of 46 out of 100, three points lower than in the previous year, reflecting a deterioration in political rights and civil liberties during 2025 (Freedom House 2026). This report also highlights persistent corruption and gives the country only 1 out of 4 points for the existence of effective safeguards against official corruption (Freedom House 2026). Earlier assessments described corruption as endemic, noting that bribery has particularly serious effects on the judiciary, police and government contracting, while petty corruption impedes citizens' access to basic public services (Freedom House 2024).

The latest Bertelsman Transformation Index (BTI) report describes Côte d'Ivoire under President Alassane Ouattara as a form of developmental authoritarianism. This

model has produced strong economic growth, substantial infrastructure investment and a degree of political stability, with some of its benefits reaching broader segments of the population (BTI 2026). However, these achievements have coincided with a concentration of political power, the manipulation of electoral rules and the instrumentalisation of the judiciary against political opponents. The report also identifies the limited enforcement of anti-corruption policies as an important weakness of the government's reform efforts (BTI 2026).

In the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for 2024, Côte d'Ivoire received a score of 42.09 out of 100 for control of corruption, representing a modest improvement compared with a decade earlier (World Bank 2025a). This indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand corruption, as well as the capture of the state by elites and private interests (World Bank n.d. c). Other corruption related governance dimensions also slightly improved, including rule of law and regulatory quality (see Table 1).

Table 1: Côte d'Ivoire's Governance Scores on the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) in 2014, 2019 and 2024.¹

	2014		2019		2024	
	Score	Standard error	Score	Standard error	Score	Standard error
Voice and accountability	44.88	2.29	48.72	2.46	46.06	2.49
Political stability	48.18	4.03	48.58	4.03	51.48	4.00
Government effectiveness	37.31	3.69	41.83	3.69	45.20	3.57
Regulatory quality	46.21	2.44	49.88	2.44	52.23	2.44
Rule of law	45.61	2.28	46.64	2.31	47.01	2.36
Control of corruption	39.25	3.15	37.12	3.14	42.09	3.13

Source: World Bank 2025a.

Public opinion data present a similarly mixed picture. Corruption did not rank among the problems most frequently identified as Côte d'Ivoire's most pressing in the latest Afrobarometer survey, conducted in January 2024. Respondents instead prioritised the rising cost of living (25.9%), unemployment (13.9%), water supply (9.3%), healthcare

¹ For the description of recent changes in the WGI methodology, see: World Bank (2025b).

(8.6%) and road infrastructure (8.2%) (Afrobarometer 2024: 14). However, responses to questions specifically concerning corruption revealed substantial distrust of several public institutions. The proportions of respondents who believed that “most” or “all” members of a given institution were involved in corruption were highest for the police and gendarmerie (51.3%), judges and magistrates (39.2%) and tax officials (38.8%). The president, parliamentarians and other public officials were perceived as comparatively less affected (Afrobarometer 2024: 39-40).

Moreover, 37.9% of respondents believed that corruption had increased “a lot” during the preceding year. Almost three-quarters stated that ordinary citizens risked retaliation or other negative consequences if they reported corruption to the authorities (Afrobarometer 2024: 41). These findings suggest that corruption may not be viewed as the country’s most urgent socioeconomic problem but is nevertheless perceived as widespread within key public institutions. Fear of retaliation may also discourage reporting and contribute to the under-detection of corrupt conduct.

Business surveys provide further evidence of the scale of the problem. The 2023 World Bank Enterprise Survey found that 63.8% of firms in Côte d’Ivoire identified corruption as a major or very severe constraint, compared with 30.6% in sub-Saharan Africa and 22.5% across all surveyed economies (World Bank n.d. d). In addition, 12% of firms selected corruption as their single greatest obstacle, compared with 7.5% in sub-Saharan Africa and 5.3% across all economies (World Bank n.d. d).

Taken together, the available international indicators, public opinion data and business surveys point to persistent and systemic corruption, despite improvements in some governance measures over the past decade. They also show that experiences and perceptions vary: corruption may not rank among citizens’ most urgent concerns, yet it is widely perceived within institutions such as the police, judiciary and tax administration and constitutes a serious obstacle for businesses.

Forms of corruption

Corruption in Côte d'Ivoire takes various forms and is reported across different levels of government and sectors. However, the available evidence is particularly extensive for two forms: bribery and the embezzlement or misappropriation of public funds.

Bribery

According to the US Department of State's (2026) investment climate statements report, businesses encounter corruption at every level of Côte d'Ivoire's civil service. Available evidence indicates that bribery affects interactions between citizens, businesses and public officials across several sectors, including healthcare, education, construction, customs and land.

In the healthcare sector, informal payments in exchange for medical treatment are reportedly commonplace. In December 2021, the Ministry for the Promotion of Good Governance, Capacity Building and the Fight against Corruption presented the results of field investigations into corruption in healthcare facilities (Bony 2021; RFI 2021). The investigations, which involved undercover agents and hidden cameras, uncovered practices including charging patients for services that should have been provided free of charge, diverting patients to private clinics, trafficking blood bags, and abuse of function with overbilling (Bony 2021; RFI 2021). In January 2022, several healthcare workers were sanctioned following investigations conducted in Abidjan during the latter part of 2021. The misconduct identified included diverting patients to private clinics, selling medicines on the black market and misappropriating hospitalisation fees (AIP 2022).

Bribery has also been documented in other areas of public administration. In 2023, the High Authority for Good Governance (Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance - HABG) announced that 17 people had been arrested for corruption related offences between July 2022 and March 2023 (Abidjan.net 2023; N'Guessan 2023). In one case, six officials from the regional directorate for education and literacy allegedly demanded payments of CFAF 5,000 (around US\$9) from candidates in exchange for accepting their application files (Abidjan.net 2023). In another case, a local office manager at the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Urban Planning was arrested in September 2022 for allegedly accepting payments from people who lacked the necessary permits in exchange for allowing construction work to continue (HABG 2023).

These investigations also uncovered attempted bribery of enforcement officials. After two trucks carrying mobile phones accompanied by false customs declarations were

intercepted, the suspected owner of these vehicles reportedly went to the HABG and offered money to investigators to halt the ongoing investigation. The individual was immediately arrested (Abidjan.net 2023).

Evidence from businesses indicates that demands for informal payments are relatively widespread. The 2023 Formal Sector World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) conducted among the owners and senior managers of 649 firms in Côte d'Ivoire, found that 19.8% of firms had experienced at least one request for a bribe (World Bank n.d. d). This was slightly above the average for sub-Saharan Africa (16.8%) and almost twice the average across all surveyed economies (11%) (World Bank n.d. d). Similarly, 20.8% of firms reported that they were expected to give gifts to public officials to “get things done”, compared with 17.9% in sub-Saharan Africa and 10.8% across all economies (World Bank n.d. d).

There is also evidence of transnational bribery involving foreign multinational corporations. In 2022, a British court ordered Glencore's UK subsidiary to pay approximately £280 million after it pleaded guilty to corruption offences involving bribes paid through employees and agents to secure preferential access to oil in several African countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and South Sudan (SFO 2022).

Bribery risks also arise in land administration, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire's rapidly expanding urban land market. A qualitative study focused on Greater Abidjan reports that complex and protracted procedures for obtaining land titles create opportunities for officials to solicit bribes or unofficial payments to advance applications (Kouambla 2026: 6602). It also identifies the circumvention of procedures, fraudulent or duplicate titles and the dispossession of legitimate rights holders as manifestations of land corruption (Kouambla 2026: 6616). These problems are compounded by inconsistencies between customary and statutory systems of land ownership. In 2025, numerous complainants accused officials in the Ministry of Construction of misconduct relating to competing land claims, prompting an internal investigation; a ministry official also acknowledged that approximately 20 officials had recently been dismissed for “questionable” practices (Jeannin 2025a).

Embezzlement

GI-TOC (2025) identifies embezzlement and the misappropriation of public funds as forms of corruption occurring at senior levels of the Ivorian state. Reported cases have involved high-ranking public officials, government ministers and directors of state-owned or semi-public enterprises (GI-TOC 2025).

In 2019, an international arrest warrant was issued for Noël Akossi Bendjo, the former mayor of Plateau, the administrative and business district of Abidjan, and a senior official of PDCI (APA 2019). Bendjo was tried in absentia and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for offences related to the alleged embezzlement of approximately CFAF 5 billion (around US\$9 million) in public funds (APA 2019). According to the prosecution, Bendjo had signed an agreement with a private company to collect advertising and public domain occupancy fees, but the revenue allegedly never reached the municipality's accounts (APA 2019). The case generated considerable controversy because of its political dimensions and concerns surrounding the proceedings, including the fact that Bendjo was tried in absentia and reportedly without legal representation. His lawyers denounced the procedure, while his political allies portrayed the prosecution as politically motivated.

In April 2020, former prime minister and opposition leader Guillaume Soro was also convicted in absentia of receiving misappropriated public funds and money laundering (Caballero 2020). Prosecutors alleged that approximately CFAF 1.5 billion (approx. US\$2.6 million) in public funds had been used to purchase his Abidjan residence in 2007 through an arrangement involving a private company (Caballero 2020). Soro was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment (TV5Monde 2020). The timing and political context of the proceedings raised questions about possible political motivations. Soro's arrest warrant was announced in December 2019, when he was returning to Côte d'Ivoire after spending several months abroad, and he was separately accused of conspiring to overthrow President Alassane Ouattara (AFP 2019). Observers and Soro's supporters consequently viewed the embezzlement conviction as an attempt to prevent him from contesting the October 2020 presidential election (Caballero 2020).

More recent cases indicate that the misappropriation of public resources remains a concern. In 2026, the former secretary general of the national tourism council was sentenced to five years in prison and fined for the embezzlement of public funds, forgery and money laundering (Diarra 2026a). The case reportedly involved fraudulent documents and hundreds of millions of CFA francs in transactions with private suppliers (Diarra 2026a).

Also in 2026, the former financial manager of the Abidjan urban transport project was sentenced to ten years in prison for the misappropriation of project funds, illicit enrichment and money laundering (Koaci 2026a). The case concerned funds intended to compensate or relocate people affected by the construction of one road. In addition to imprisonment and a monetary penalty, the court ordered the confiscation of several assets, temporarily deprived him of his civil and political rights and prohibited him from holding certain financial management or public sector positions for three years (Koaci 2026a). Although he acknowledged receiving the

money, he maintained that the payments constituted lawful bonuses and allowances authorised by his superiors (Koaci 2026a).

Main sectors affected by corruption

Corruption is reportedly deeply ingrained in public and private sector practices in Côte d'Ivoire, particularly negatively affecting judicial proceedings, contract awards, customs and tax matters (US Department of State 2026). This section, therefore, focuses on sectors reportedly most affected by corruption, including police, customs and tax administration, judiciary and public procurement.

Police and the broader security sector

Corruption in the police and broader security sector ranges from routine extortion of road users to the diversion of seized illicit goods. Available evidence also points to hierarchical dimensions of corruption and uneven accountability within the security services.

Research by Amnesty International (2024: 3) indicates that racketeering occurs at different levels of the security service hierarchy. However, sanctions tend to be imposed primarily on lower ranking officers, while their superiors frequently escape accountability. According to the report, lower ranking officers may engage in racketeering to meet demands from their superiors or to compensate for unpaid bonuses (Amnesty International 2024: 3).

GI-TOC (2025) similarly identifies extortion, bribery and abuse of power by law enforcement officers, particularly in rural areas. It describes extortion by uniformed personnel at security checkpoints as a widespread concern and reports that lower ranking border police officers have been implicated in facilitating human trafficking (GI-TOC 2025).

Several prosecutions illustrate these practices. In November 2021, the Abidjan Military Tribunal began hearing a series of cases involving police officers and gendarmes accused of extorting road users (Ciyow 2021; APA 2021). In the opening proceedings, one gendarme was sentenced to two years' imprisonment and a monetary fine, another was acquitted, and six cases were returned for further investigation (Ciyow 2021; APA 2021). More than 60 cases of alleged racketeering involving police officers and gendarmes were reportedly due to be considered during the 2021-2022 judicial year (APA 2021).

In 2024, a police captain was sentenced to five years in prison and a monetary fine for extortion (Chresus 2024). While investigating the theft of a mobile phone, he reportedly detained a suspect and demanded CFAF 1 million (approx. US\$1.7 million) from the suspect's family in exchange for his release and the withdrawal of the complaint (Chresus 2024).

In 2025, the former head of the Port of Abidjan anti-drug police unit and three other defendants were sentenced to five years' imprisonment for diverting around 220 kilograms of cocaine from a seizure made in 2021 (Jeannin 2025b). The cocaine was reportedly sold through a parallel distribution network, while official seizure records were manipulated to conceal its diversion. Six other gendarmes prosecuted in connection with the case were acquitted (Jeannin 2025b).

In 2026, the Abidjan Military Tribunal sentenced a warrant officer in the armed forces to five years' imprisonment and a fine for extortion and violating official instructions (C. K. 2026). The officer had established an unauthorised checkpoint and accepted CFAF 5,000 (around US\$9) from two motorcyclists he had stopped for riding without helmets (C. K. 2026).

Taken together, the evidence points to both low-level, transactional corruption, particularly extortion at checkpoints, and more organised forms of misconduct involving senior officers and illicit markets. Reports that lower ranking personnel sometimes collect money for their superiors further suggest that corruption within the security services has a networked nature. Weak supervision, hierarchical pressure and the inconsistent punishment of senior officers may enable such practices to persist.

Customs and tax administration

Available evidence points to bribery in routine interactions with officials, as well as more complex schemes involving customs fraud and allegedly improper tax relief.

The import and export of goods in Côte d'Ivoire are governed by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework. Certain goods require import licences or prior authorisation from the relevant ministries, including petroleum products, certain alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals and medical devices, livestock and animal products, and selected textiles (ITA 2026). According to GI-TOC (2025), the arms trafficking market is well established, driven by violent extremist groups and traditional self-defence militias. The Ouangolodougou area in the Tchologo region is a major transit point for both licit and illicit goods (GI-TOC 2025). Côte d'Ivoire is also a source country, transit hub and destination for counterfeit goods, including pharmaceutical products, textiles, automotive parts, alcohol and cigarettes (GI-TOC 2025). The US Department of State (2026) highlights that clearing goods through

Côte d'Ivoire's ports frequently requires the payment of substantive “commissions”, and that bribe demands can keep containers at the Port of Abidjan for months, despite companies having proper paperwork.

The 2023 Formal Sector World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) in Côte d'Ivoire, conducted among owners and senior managers of 649 firms, provides further evidence of corruption risks in tax administration. It found that 20.3% of firms expected to provide gifts during meetings with tax officials, compared with 12.5% in sub-Saharan Africa and 7.9% across all surveyed economies (World Bank n.d. d).

The size of Côte d'Ivoire's informal sector creates additional challenges for tax collection and regulatory enforcement. Some recent estimates suggest that Côte d'Ivoire has a large informal sector accounting for 38% of GDP (Mkhize-Malebo and Cilliers 2026). For example, Karlen et al. (2023) note that the urban informal sector has become a vital source of livelihood in the country, employing nearly 7 million workers, which is more than either agriculture or the formal sector. In the same survey, 66.7% of firms identified the practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major or very severe constraint,² compared with 31.7% in sub-Saharan Africa and 22.3% across all economies (World Bank n.d. d). Although this indicator does not directly measure corruption, the coexistence of a large informal sector and uneven regulatory enforcement may create opportunities for bribery, selective enforcement and collusion between businesses and public officials.

In 2018, 18 people were taken into custody in connection with the fraudulent registration of imported vehicles at Abidjan's Single Window for Automobiles. The scheme reportedly involved customs officials and personnel from several public and private bodies participating in the vehicle registration process. Prosecutors stated that approximately 1,000 vehicles had fraudulently circumvented customs procedures, causing an estimated loss of between CFAF 2 billion and CFAF 3 billion (US\$3.5 and US\$5.3 million) to the state (Konan 2018). Although the authorities announced an audit and introduced some digital reforms, no final audit report appears to have been made public (Diarra 2026b).

In 2021, the government announced a “war” on corruption within the customs administration. The then minister in charge of promoting good governance, capacity

² This indicator measures “Percentage of firms identifying practices of competitors in the informal sector as major constraint. The computation of the indicator is based on the rating of the obstacle as a potential constraint to the current operations of the establishment”. The question is “To what degree are practices of competitors in the informal sector an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?” with options including “no obstacle”, “minor obstacle”, “major obstacle”, and “very severe obstacle” (World Bank 2026: 183).

building and the fight against corruption announced a large-scale awareness raising campaign within the customs administration (Niada 2021).

In January 2025, the chief of staff of Côte d'Ivoire's army ordered the suspension of five officials working on curbing cocoa smuggling in the west of the country, including the prefect of the town of Sipilou, police commissioner, head of the armed forces detachment, commander of the gendarmerie brigade and head of the customs office, accusing them of involvement in trafficking, following an investigation (Aboa 2025). Allegedly, large quantities of cocoa were illegally transported across the border with the help of corrupt authorities, with smugglers reportedly paying on average CFAF 15 million (approx. US\$26,00) per truck, to avoid inspection (Aboa 2025).

In July 2026, the Union of Tax Administration Employees filed a complaint³ concerning alleged irregular tax abatements and exemptions that may have caused losses exceeding CFAF 39 billion (around US\$69 million) (Kautcha 2026). The allegations included the manipulation of electronic authorisation procedures and the fraudulent use of electronic signatures to approve tax relief (Kautcha 2026). Media reports suggested that several tax officials may have been detained, although this had not been officially confirmed (Kautcha 2026).

Overall, the evidence indicates that corruption risks in customs and tax administration arise at several stages, from routine encounters between firms and officials to the manipulation of vehicle registration, customs clearance and tax relief procedures. Limited public information about the outcomes of major investigations further weakens accountability and makes it difficult to assess whether reforms have reduced these risks.

Judiciary

Corruption risks in the judiciary are closely connected to broader concerns about political interference, weak judicial independence and selective enforcement.

International governance assessments consistently conclude that Côte d'Ivoire's judiciary lacks independence (Freedom House 2017, 2022, 2026; BTI 2026). As discussed above, decisions by the constitutional council to exclude opposition candidates from elections on various grounds have reinforced concerns about the politicisation of institutions responsible for interpreting and enforcing the law.

³ At the time of writing, the investigation is still ongoing and there has not yet been a published and verifiable outcome.

Freedom House has consistently awarded Côte d'Ivoire only 1 out of 4 points for judicial independence. Its assessments state that judges are susceptible to external interference and bribery, that procedures for assigning cases to judges are opaque and that courts frequently adjudicate politically sensitive cases in accordance with the interests of the ruling party (Freedom House 2017, 2022, 2023). Freedom House also concluded that the judiciary was mobilised to support President Alassane Ouattara's third term candidacy in 2020 (Freedom House 2017, 2022, 2023). The country continued to receive a score of 1 out of 4 for judicial independence in 2026 (Freedom House 2026).

Research and interviews conducted by Amnesty International (2024: 3) similarly identified perceptions of corruption throughout the justice system. Although the relevant criminal investigation bodies and the Military Tribunal have handled hundreds of corruption cases, interviewees questioned the impartiality of enforcement. They perceived the authorities as concentrating on relatively minor cases and lower ranking officials rather than investigating senior political figures and businesspeople who were widely considered to be involved in more serious corruption (Amnesty International 2024: 3).

Another issue noted in Amnesty International's (2024, p. 3) research is the limited public access to information on corruption investigations and judicial outcomes. Although specialised institutions make some hearings public, they do not systematically publish the results of investigations, decisions or convictions, and information requests may go unanswered. Amnesty International (2024: 6) therefore recommended making the hearings and sentences of courts responsible for curbing corruption public to improve transparency of the anti-corruption effort.

Allegations of informal and excessive fees indicate that corruption risks may also affect citizens' routine interactions with the court system. In August 2026, several court users anonymously accused the chief clerk of the Danané court of charging CFAF 35,000 (around US\$62) for issuing an extract from the trade and personal property credit register, although the official fee was reportedly CFAF 15,000 (US\$26) (Koaci 2026b). The allegations had not been formally established at the time of reporting, and no outcome of an official investigation was available.

An earlier case indicated potential corruption involving a member of the judiciary at a higher level. In 2018, the High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) referred 15 cases involving alleged losses amounting to tens of billions of CFA francs to the public prosecutor's office. The individuals under investigation reportedly included a magistrate, financial directors, elected officials, a civil administrator and former senior executives of public and private companies (VOA Afrique 2018). The alleged offences included corruption, abuse of office, misappropriation of public and private funds, illicit enrichment and money laundering (VOA Afrique 2018). However,

limited subsequent information about the outcomes of these cases reflects the broader transparency problem identified by Amnesty International (2024).

Overall, corruption risks in the justice sector appear to operate at several levels: alleged informal payments for routine court services, the susceptibility of judges to bribery and external pressure, selective enforcement that disproportionately targets lower ranking officials, and limited transparency surrounding investigations and judgements.

Public procurement

Public procurement is widely identified as an area of significant corruption risk in Côte d'Ivoire. According to the US Department of State's (2026) investment climate statements report, public procurement processes are opaque, with government contracts occasionally awarded outside of public tenders, while many firms continue to cite corruption as an obstacle to transparent contracting.

The 2023 World Bank Enterprise Survey indicates that participating in public tenders imposes a substantial administrative burden on firms. Côte d'Ivoire received a score of 73.4 out of 100 for the perceived difficulty of complying with tender requirements,⁴ (73.4), where a higher score indicates greater difficulty. This was considerably higher than the averages for sub-Saharan Africa (58.9) and all surveyed economies (54.9) (World Bank n.d. d). Such complex requirements (at least perceived as such) may restrict competition and create opportunities for discretion and informal payments, particularly where rules are not applied consistently.

The 2024 MAPS⁵ (2024: 7-8) evaluation identified several structural integrity risks in Côte d'Ivoire's procurement system. These included overlapping regulatory responsibilities between the national public procurement regulatory authority (Autorité Nationale de Régulation des Marchés Publics – ANRMP)⁶ and the directorate general of public procurement (Direction Générale des Marchés Publics - DGMP); the involvement of the minister responsible for public procurement in authorising restricted procurement procedure and the minister's power to modify shortlists of

⁴ The survey question is: “How difficult does this establishment find the administrative requirements to participate in a public tender? Please consider the time and resources that the establishment used in order to prepare a bid. This question measures “Perceptions of the degree of difficulty to comply with government contract tender requirements. For this indicator, 0 is assigned for “not difficult at all”, 33 for “somewhat difficult”, 66 for “moderately difficult”, and 100 for “very difficult” (World Bank 2026: 161).”

⁵ Evaluation of the public procurement system based on the OECD's methodology for assessing national procurement systems (MAPS II), with technical support from the African Development Bank (MAPS 2024: 7).

⁶ Please refer to the final section of this Helpdesk Answer regarding the details about this body and its replacement by a new procurement authority in 2025.

bidders, which may create conflicts of interest (MPAS 2024:79). In addition, certain transactions, including the granting of mining and petroleum licences, fall outside the scope of the public procurement code, limiting the application of standard transparency and competition requirements (MAPS 2024: 79).

The MAPS (2024) evaluation also reported statistics from HABG showing strong perceptions of corruption among businesses and civil society. Of 162 surveyed companies, 73% responded “yes” or “yes, to some extent” when asked whether giving gifts to secure public contracts was common (MAPS 2024: 79). Perceptions were even more negative among civil society organisations (CSOs): 83.3% of the 258 surveyed organisations considered corruption to be a common practice in public procurement (MAPS 2024: Annex, 6). These findings, although based on perceptions, point to a lack of confidence across different groups regarding the integrity of the public procurement process.

The ANRMP’s report for 2023 provides further evidence of serious weaknesses in procurement integrity in Côte d’Ivoire. It noted an increase in substantiated complaints concerning irregularities and fraudulent practices and identified the absence of audit results on contract implementation and public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an important accountability gap (ANRMP 2024: 5). An audit found that 22% of the contracts examined did not comply with the public procurement code (ANRMP 2024). Irregularities included the use of negotiated or restricted procedures without the required prior authorisation from the minister responsible for public procurement; failure to apply the technical criteria specified in tender documentation; lack of evidence that contract award decisions had been published in the relevant bulletin; approval by officials without the necessary authority; and failure to publish calls for tenders (ANRMP 2024: 34-35). Although these irregularities do not in themselves prove corruption, they constitute recognised integrity red flags because they can facilitate favouritism, restrict competition and reduce public scrutiny (e.g., Fazekas and Tóth 2016).


Alleged irregularities in the management of sports infrastructure provide one illustration of these risks. Following flooding at the Ebimpé Stadium, the government allocated CFAF 20 billion (app. US\$32 million) to renovate its infrastructure. Subsequent reporting alleged overbilling, the allocation of contracts to individuals close to senior officials of the national office of sports and the award of a contract for restoring the pitch to a company without relevant experience (US Department of State 2024).

Concerns about non-competitive contracting are longstanding. In 2013, sole-source or no-bid contracts reportedly represented approximately 40% of public procurement by value. Amid concerns that opaque contracting practices could facilitate corruption and deter investors, the ANRMP announced an audit of negotiated contracts awarded

by six ministries between 2011 and 2013 (Bavier 2013). An ANRMP audit of 60 negotiated contracts awarded across six ministries between 2011 and 2013 found that, in 95% of the cases examined, the reasons given for using such procedures were not justified under the applicable procurement regulations (ANRMP 2014).

Weaknesses in procurement transparency should also be understood within the broader system of public financial management. The 2023 Open Budget Survey gave Côte d'Ivoire a budget transparency score of 54 out of 100,⁷ ranking it 51 among 125 countries (International Budget Partnership 2024). Although this represented a substantial improvement compared with 2017, it remained below the score of 61 considered necessary to support informed public debate (see Figure 3) (International Budget Partnership 2024).

Figure 3: Transparency score changes for Côte d'Ivoire between 2017-2023.



Source: International Budget Partnership 2024: 3.

Opportunities for public participation in the budget process were particularly limited, receiving a score of only 4 out of 100, while legislative and audit oversight received a composite score of 43 out of 100 (International Budget Partnership 2024: 6, 8).

Overall, the evidence points to corruption risks arising from non-competitive procedures, ministerial discretion, overlapping institutional responsibilities, limited publication of procurement information and inadequate monitoring of contract implementation. Recent reforms have improved parts of the procurement framework, but persistent irregularities and widespread negative perceptions among businesses and civil society indicate significant implementation and enforcement gaps.

⁷ A transparency score above 61 is considered to mean that a country provides enough material to support an informed public debate on the budget (International Budget Partnership 2024).

Legal and institutional anti-corruption framework

International conventions and initiatives

Côte d'Ivoire has ratified several international treaties and joined a number of relevant anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, particularly since 2012, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: The progress in anti-corruption reforms and initiatives in Côte d'Ivoire since 2012.



Source: Transparency International 2021.

The most important include:

- United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), ratified in October 2012 (UNODC n.d.).
- African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), ratified in 2012 (African Union n.d.).
- Agreement for the Establishment of the International Anti-Corruption Academy as an International Organisation, to which Côte d'Ivoire acceded in November 2015 (IACA n.d.).
- United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC), ratified in October 2012 (UN Treaty Collection n.d.).

- ECOWAS Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption which was ratified in 2024.
- Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which Côte d'Ivoire joined in May 2008. The country received a moderate score in the latest, 2023 validation regarding the implementation of the 2019 EITI Standard (EITI n.d.).
- The Open Government Partnership (OGP), which Côte d'Ivoire joined in 2015. The OGP has praised the country's recent efforts to establish a united front against corruption involving different stakeholders, including civil society (OGP 2025a). Its fifth action plan (2024-2026) expands reforms intended to promote civic participation and contains commitments relating to open parliament, local open government and health service delivery (OGP 2025b).
- Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA), of which Côte d'Ivoire is a member. Established in 1999 as a specialised institution, GIABA seeks to protect West African economies against money laundering and terrorist financing (GIABA n.d. a). Its principal roles include supporting member states in developing their AML/CFT capacities and assessing their compliance with relevant international standards (GIABA n.d. b).
- the participation of Côte d'Ivoire's financial intelligence unit, CENTIF, in regional cooperation networks, including the network of national financial intelligence units of ECOWAS (UN 2026).

Domestic legal framework

The principal pieces of legislation addressing corruption and related offences in Côte d'Ivoire include the ordinance no. 2013-660 (the Ordonnance relative à la prévention et à la lutte contre la corruption et les infractions assimilées) of September 2013. It constitutes the country's central anti-corruption legislation and contains provisions concerning both the prevention and measure to curb corruption and related offences (MAPS 2024: 79). In addition, ordinance no. 2013-661, which determines the powers, organisation and operation of the HABG, the main institution responsible for coordinating measures to counter and prevent corruption (HABG n.d. b)

The asset declaration provisions of ordinance no. 2013-660 extended the obligation to declare assets, previously applicable only to president, to a broader range of senior public officials and political representatives (including MPs, district governors, managers of public companies, among others) (HABG n.d. a). Several implementing

decrees (nos. 2014-219, 2018-100) regulate the application of these provisions (HABG n.d. a).

Ordinance no. 2023-875 is the new main legislation on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). It replaced law no. 2016-992 and incorporated the new West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) Uniform AML/CFT Law into Ivorian legislation (GIABA 2026). In addition, the country has also adopted legislative and regulatory measures addressing specific elements of the AML/CFT framework, including criminal investigations and prosecutions, seizure and confiscation, international cooperation and targeted financial sanctions (GIABA 2026: 2);

Since 2024, Côte d'Ivoire has a new legal framework mandating the disclosure of beneficial ownership. However, despite the fact that the law stipulates that the register is available to the public, the implementing decree, no. 2024-583, restricts such access to general information about the reporting entity and does not permit public access to information identifying its beneficial owners (EITI n.d.; CENTIF n.d.);

Law no. 2018-570 covers the protection of witnesses, victims, whistleblowers, experts and other concerned persons (HABG n.d. b). Available measures include protection of the individual's physical and mental integrity, identity, privacy and personal data, as well as confidentiality measures such as anonymity and the possibility of electing domicile at a police station, gendarmerie brigade, or prosecutor's office. However, Amnesty International (2024: 2) notes that it does not have a dedicated whistleblower protection law.

Finally, law no. 2013-867 on access to information of public interest requires public bodies to provide access to the administrative information. The law also established the commission for access to public interest information and public documents (CAIDP), which oversees its implementation and hears appeals against refusals of access (OGP 2018).

Institutional framework

High Authority for Good Governance (Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance - HABG)

The High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) was established under the ordinances 2013-660 and 2013-661 in 2013. Formally, it is an independent administrative legal authority with financial autonomy, and its jurisdiction extends throughout the country (HABG n.d. c). Among its principal responsibilities, the

HABG coordinates anti-corruption efforts in Côte d'Ivoire in cooperation with specialised regulatory and law enforcement units (MAPS 2024: 79; Transparency International 2021). Its mandate also includes raising public awareness to corruption, investigating suspected corruption in the public and private sectors, receiving complaints and collecting asset declarations from designated public officials upon entering and leaving office (HABG n.d. c; US Department of State 2026). However, the HABG does not have prosecutorial powers and must refer cases to the competent public prosecutor and there have been criticisms of its independence (HABG n.d. c; US Department of State 2026; US Department of State 2023).

Compliance with asset declaration obligations has improved, with the overall declaration rate increasing from 83% in 2023 to 90.99% in 2024, with 27 cases of sanctions applied for non-compliance during the same period (US Department of State 2026; Diaby 2026). The IMF (2026: 20) similarly observes that compliance remains high and that the HABG has begun piloting procedures for verifying submitted declarations, although there is little evidence on the effectiveness of this compliance so far. Nevertheless, the IMF emphasises the continuing need for regulatory reforms to modernise the system through digitalisation, effective risk-based verification and the consistent enforcement of sanctions (IMF 2026: 20).

In March 2026, the HABG presented its 2025 activity report, which again recorded a high overall compliance with asset declaration requirements. Nevertheless, the report identified delays among local elected officials, particularly mayors and their deputies, for whom the declaration rate was below 60% (HABG 2026).

Despite a growing administrative reach of HABG, reflected in the growing compliance with asset declaration rules, Gumba (2021) highlighted that the HABG had done little to publicise the outcomes of its corruption cases, potentially limiting their deterrent effect and undermining public confidence.

Court of auditors (Cour des Comptes)

The court of auditors was established under organic law no. 2018-979 in 2018 (Cour des Comptes 2026). It is composed of five chambers, each responsible for one area, including:

- “Chamber 1 is in charge of auditing the state's accounts. it is also responsible for monitoring the implementation of the finance law, the general declaration of conformity, program performance audits, and annual performance reports
- Chamber 2 is responsible for the non-judicial control of territorial collectivities and autonomous districts

- Chamber 3 is responsible for the non-judicial control of national public institutions, state-owned companies, companies with public financial participation, bodies receiving public funds, concessionary services, social security and welfare bodies, as well as bodies benefiting from public generosity
- Chamber 4 is responsible for jurisdictional control. It is notably responsible for judging the public accountants, the accounts of de facto accountants, and cases of mismanagement
- finally, Chamber 5 is responsible for quality control of the reports and judgments produced by the various chambers. It is also responsible for producing the annual public report” (Cour des Comptes n.d.).

Specifically, the court of auditors examines the reports on government revenue and expenditures quarterly and assists parliamentary oversight (UN 2026: 8). However, the legal framework does not specify mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of recommendations arising from this oversight (UN 2026: 8).

The annual reports are published on the website of the court of auditors. In its latest report, it notes that it examined 1,165 accounts, with irregularities identified relating to general and supporting documents, accounting and financial transactions (Cour des Comptes 2026).

Public procurement regulatory authority (Autorité de Régulation de la Commande Publique - ARCOP)

Côte d'Ivoire has undertaken several reforms of its public procurement system, beginning with the establishment of the national public procurement regulatory authority (Autorité nationale de régulation des marchés publics - ANRMP) in 2009 (MAPS 2024). Ordinance no. 2018-594 defined the ANRMP's mandate, while ordinance no. 2019-679 introduced the public procurement code. Subsequent decrees regulated public-private partnerships (PPPs) and clarified cooperation between the ANRMP, the general directorate of public procurement (Direction générale des marchés publics - DGMP)⁸ and the national steering committee for public-private partnerships (CNP-PPP) (ANRMP 2024: 7; ANRMP 2025).

ANRMP was established to regulate public procurement and to audit and sanction private entities who fail to comply with the public procurement regulations as well as

⁸ Responsible principally for advising contracting authorities, overseeing procurement procedures and conducting ex ante and ex post controls (DGMP n.d.).

to provide recommendations to ministries to address identified irregularities. Since 2022, the country has an e-procurement [platform](#) (US Department of State 2026).

In January 2025, the government established the public procurement regulatory authority (ARCOP) to replace the ANRMP. The reform was intended to strengthen the regulator's institutional structure and its oversight and sanctioning powers (In Cote D'Ivoire 2025). The change of name also expressly confirmed its jurisdiction over both conventional public contracts and PPPs, while the establishing decree granted ARCOP quasi-judicial powers (In Cote D'Ivoire 2025).

ARCOP is now Côte d'Ivoire's independent public procurement regulator. Its mandate includes promoting good governance and preventing fraud and corruption; conducting independent audits of contract award and execution; resolving procurement disputes; and monitoring compliance with its decisions and audit recommendations (ARCOP 2025). It may sanction private actors, recommend sanctions against public officials, refer suspected irregularities to the competent administrative or judicial authorities, advise on legal and policy reforms, and maintain records of suppliers and officials excluded for procurement violations (ARCOP 2025).

General inspectorate of finance (Inspection Générale des Finances)

The general inspectorate of finance is an internal control body within the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Budget. Its mandate includes auditing the ministry's departments and entities under its supervision, verifying the use of public resources and improving the effectiveness of anti-fraud and anti-corruption controls, among its other tasks (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget n.d. a).

The inspectorate also includes a specialised unit, the anti-corruption brigade (Brigade de lutte contre la corruption – BLC), which was established in 2012 and investigates corruption, fraud, and financial crime (DGMP 2013).

State Inspectorate General (IGE)

The State Inspectorate General (IGE) is responsible for ensuring that management of public resources comply with laws and regulations and evaluates the use of public resources in terms of effectiveness and also helps to prevent fraudulent practices and detect embezzlement and irregularities (Portail Officiel du Gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire n.d.).

Specialised anti-corruption and anti-money laundering units

Côte d'Ivoire has established several specialised anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering bodies. The most relevant include:

- The economic and financial crime division (Le Pôle Pénal Économique et Financier – PPEF), created in 2020. It is a specialised first instance criminal court responsible for the prosecution, investigation and adjudication of economic and financial offences (Ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme n.d.). Specialised police and gendarmerie units, including judicial police officers and agents, conduct investigations into offences falling within the PPEF's jurisdiction (N'Guessan n.d.);
- The national financial information processing unit (Cellule Nationale de Traitement des Informations financières - CENTIF) is the financial intelligence unit of Côte d'Ivoire. CENTIF is an administrative authority under the supervision of the minister responsible for finance, although it possesses financial autonomy and autonomous decision-making powers within its area of competence (CENTIF n.d.). The IMF (2023) found that financial intelligence disseminated by CENTIF had contributed to money laundering convictions and confiscations but noted that the body has limited technical and IT capacities and insufficient human resources. Moreover, the IMF (2023) stresses that most investigative authorities in the country make little use of financial intelligence to investigate money laundering;
- the customs unit for combating racketeering (L'Unité Spéciale de Lutte Contre le Racket en Douane - USLRD) is tasked with combating corruption and extortion in customs, dismantling improvised checkpoints, removing obstacles to efficient customs clearance and receiving complaints from users and economic operators (Des Douanes Ivoiriennes n.d.).

Agency for the management and recovery of criminal assets (Agence de Gestion et de Recouvrement des Avoirs Criminels – AGRAC)

AGRAC was established by decree no. 2022-349 in June 2022, with two subsequent amendments since (no. 2022-982 and no. 2024-582) (AGRAC n.d. a). AGRAC is as a public institution with financial autonomy, subject to the administrative and technical supervision of the Ministry of Justice and the economic and financial supervision of the ministry in charge of the budget (AGRAC n.d. a).

AGRAC executes judicial and administrative decisions about freezing, seizing or confiscating criminal assets. It manages and preserves seized property, recovers confiscated assets, arranges sales of assets susceptible to depreciation and

implements decisions concerning restitution (AGRAC n.d. b). Its work encompasses assets connected to corruption, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, money laundering, organised crime and other profit generating offences (AGRAC n.d. b).

The IMF (2023: 63) recommended that judicial authorities entrust all seized and confiscated funds to AGRAC and allocate these funds on a priority basis to enhance the capabilities of investigation, prosecution and adjudication agencies, as well as introduce safeguards to prevent misappropriation once seized funds are allocated to state services.

Corruption reporting platforms and initiatives

In July 2022, the government launched the platform for reporting acts of corruption and related offences, SPACIA. During 2022, SPACIA received 510 complaints involving an estimated CFAF 52.6 billion (approximately US\$87.7 million) across different economic sectors (US Department of State 2026; Amnesty International 2024). According to the US Department of State, these complaints generated 81 investigations, which led to the arrest of 20 public officials (US Department of State 2026).

In May 2023, HABG launched SIGNALIS, through which members of the public can report suspected corruption (Amnesty International 2024). In reporting its activities for 2025, HABG stated that SIGNALIS had received 451 reports, 67% of which concerned alleged corruption involving national public officials. According to HABG, these reports resulted in 40 investigation reports being transmitted to the public prosecutor's office and 37 arrests for suspected corruption (HABG 2026). However, publicly available sources on SPACIA and SIGNALIS provide limited information on subsequent judicial outcomes, such as prosecutions and convictions, and no data could be identified on assets recovered through cases originating from these reporting mechanisms.

In 2022, the Ministry for the Promotion of Good Governance, Capacity Building and Anti-Corruption⁹ launched the anti-corruption and good governance awards to recognise people who have contributed to good governance and anti-corruption efforts (Wannenwetsch and Young 2024: 17).

Other stakeholders

Media

⁹ This ministry was originally established in 2021 but dissolved already in 2023.

Public media in the country remain firmly under the control of the incumbent government, while opposition media face occasional threats and pressure from the authorities (BTI 2026). The country has an abundance of private media outlets, many of which are critical of the government, while international media are also freely available (BTI 2026). The launch of the first private channels in 2019 ended over 50 year monopoly of the Ivorian Radio and Television Broadcasting Corporation (RTI) (RSF 2026). However, an assessment by the International Republican Institute (IRI 2025) mission ahead of the 2025 presidential election found that political parties exerted considerable influence over both traditional and digital media. BTI (2026) similarly noted that state media coverage during the election campaign was biased in favour of incumbent President Alassane Ouattara and the ruling party. Freedom House (2023) notes that conditions for the media have improved since the end of the 2010-2011 conflict, although journalists face intimidation and occasional violence from security forces.

Reporters without borders (RSF) describe the media landscape in the country as fairly polarised and politicised, with numerous radio stations, newspapers and news sites, as well as a growing investigative journalism in recent years (RSF 2026). There are also several private TV channels, most of which are owned by government connected owners (RSF 2026).

Civil society

Despite some improvement in recent years, civil society organisations have traditionally been sidelined from policy-making processes in Côte d'Ivoire (BTI 2026). Although the conditions for civil society activism has improved since 2011, BTI (2026) notes that a 2024 decree increased financial reporting standards for NGOs. Recently, there have also been growing complaints from civil society actors about harassment, and alleged irregularities in granting permission to public gatherings (BTI 2026). Prominent civil society organisations and initiatives working in the field of anti-corruption include:

- [Civis-CI](#) focuses on organising accountability conferences, citizen monitoring via surveys, advocacy and research. For example, it organises annual accountability conferences and workshops to publicise the reports of the court of auditors (Amnesty International 2024: 4). In one of its ongoing programmes, Civis-CI launched a national campaign to educate and inform citizens about the electoral process ahead of elections (Civis-CI n.d.)
- The Movement for the Fight Against Injustice has established feedback groups across the country to collect information from alleged victims of corruption and human rights violations and it engages in investigations,

drafting complaints and reporting corruption to relevant authorities (Amnesty International 2024: 4).

- [Social Justice](#), focuses particularly on raising awareness of the AUCPCC among civil society organisations and the media by conducting research into the status of the implementation of the AUCPCC, focusing on money laundering, illicit enrichment, political party funding and civil society and media (Transparency International 2021). To address the historically limited cooperation between the government and civil society, Social Justice created a platform, the PACA-225 (Plateforme d'Action Civile Anti-corruption de Côte d'Ivoire), through which civil society organisations and other stakeholders can coordinate and share best practices (Transparency International 2021).

References

Abidjan.net. 2023. [Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance : 17 personnes dont 13 en situation de flagrant délit, interpellées de juillet 2022 à fin mars 2023](#). 7 April.

Abidjan.net. 2026. [Pôle pénal économique et financier : La gestion du Conseil national du tourisme sous examen](#). 15 April.

Aboa, A. 2025. [Ivory Coast Army Accuses Anti-Trafficking Officials of Smuggling Cocoa](#). Reuters. 15 January.

AFP. 2019. [Ivory Coast Issues Arrest Warrant for Presidential Candidate](#). AlJazeera. 24 December.

African Union. No date. [African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption](#).

Afrobarometer. 2024. [Résumé des résultats: Enquête d'Afrobarometer Round 10 en Côte d'Ivoire, 2024](#). Compilé par Zechlab.

AGRAC. No date a. [Création](#).

AGRAC. No date b. [Missions](#).

AIP. 2022. [Des agents de santé sanctionnés pour des faits de corruption](#). Abidjan.net. 22 January.

AlJazeera. 2021. [Ivory Coast Sentences Ex-PM Guillaume Soro to Life Imprisonment](#). 23 June.

Amnesty International. 2024. [Côte d'Ivoire: Authorities Must Respect Human Rights and Protect the Side of Anti-Corruption](#).

ANRMP. 2024. [Rapport Général sur la Commande Publique](#). ARCOP.

ANRMP. 2025. [Rapport Général sur la Commande Publique](#).

APA. 2019. [Côte d'Ivoire: un mandat d'arrêt international décerné contre Akossi Bendjo, ex-maire du Plateau](#). Abidjan.net. 6 July.

APA. 2021. [Côte d'Ivoire: un gendarme condamné à 2 ans de prison ferme pour racket](#). Abidjan.net. 5 November.

ARCOP. 2014. [L'ANRMP rend public l'audit des marchés de gré à gré passés de 2011 à 2013](#).

ARCOP. No date. [Missions](#).

Bavier, J. 2013. [Ivory Coast to Audit No-Bid Government Deals, May Cancel Some](#). Reuters. 14 August.

BBC. 2019. [Laurent Gbagbo Profile: Ivory Coast's Defiant 'Cicero'](#). 15 January.

BBC. 2020. [Former Ivory Coast Rebel Leader Guillaume Soro Fined \\$7m in Absentia](#). 28 April.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire Country Report 2026](#).

Bony, V. 2021. [Corruption: la Côte d'Ivoire utilise les caméras cachées pour lutter contre les infractions dans les services publics](#). BBC. 10 December.

Britannica Editors. No date. [Félix Houphouët-Boigny](#). Encyclopedia Britannica.

Caballero, L. 2020. [Guilty Verdict for Soro Puts Ivory Coast on Political Alert – and the ICC Back in Play](#). The Conversation. 11 May.

CENTIF. No date. [Législation et réglementation](#).

CCESP. 2022. [Lutte contre la corruption : la plateforme de dénonciation spacia.ci lancée bientôt, annonce le ministre Zoro Épiphanie Ballo](#).

Chresus, J. 2024. [Cote D'Ivoire: Extorsion de fonds, un officier de police national condamné à 5 ans de prison ferme](#). Koaci. 16 July.

Civis-CI. No date. [Ce que nous menons aujourd'hui](#).

Ciyow, Y. 2021. [En Côte d'Ivoire, la corruption des forces de l'ordre en procès](#). Le Monde Afrique. 5 November.

Coulibaly, L. 2021. [Ex-Ivory Coast President Gbagbo Launches New Party, Vows to Stay in Politics](#). Reuters. 18 October.

Cour des Comptes. 2026. [Rapport public annuel 2025](#).

Cour des Comptes. No date. [Organisation et Fonctionnement](#).

Des Douanes Ivoiriennes. No date. [Unité de Lutte contre le Racket en Douane](#).

Diarra, D. 2026a. [Côte d'Ivoire. Détournement de fonds : un haut fonctionnaire condamné à cinq ans de prison](#). Lebanco. 20 July.

Diarra, D. 2026b. [L'enquête du jeudi. Côte d'Ivoire - Le Guichet unique automobile : 30 ans d'inefficacité](#). 5 February. Lebanco.net.

DGMP. 2013. [Brigade de Lutte contre la Corruption \(BLC\) pour une stratégie d'action concertées](#).

DGMP. No date. [Missions de la Direction Générale des Marchés Publics](#).

Dyer, T. 2025. [The End of the Ivorian Miracle? Atlas Institute for International Affairs](#).

EITI. No date. [Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Fazekas, M. and Tóth, I. J. 2016. [From Corruption to State Capture: A New Analytical Framework with Empirical Applications from Hungary](#). Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 69(2).

France24. 2025. [Ivory Coast Bars Ex-President Gbagbo, Opposition Leader from Presidential Race](#). 9 August.

Freedom House. 2017. [Freedom in the World 2017 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Freedom House. 2018. [Freedom in the World 2018 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Freedom House. 2022. [Freedom in the World 2022 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Freedom House. 2023. [Freedom in the World 2023 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Freedom House. 2024. [Freedom in the World 2024 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Freedom House. 2026. [Freedom in the World 2026 Côte d'Ivoire](#).

GIABA. 2026. [Anti-money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures Côte d'Ivoire: 3rd Enhanced Follow Up Report & Technical Compliance Re-Rating](#).

GIABA. No date a. [Member States](#).

GIABA. No date b. [Core Functions](#).

GI-TOC. 2025. [Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Gumba, D. E. O. 2021. [Côte d'Ivoire Should Make More of Its Anti-Corruption Gains](#). Institute for Security Studies (ISS).

HABG. 2023. [Présentation des résultats des enquêtes de flagrance effectuées par la Haute Autorité pour la bonne gouvernance et des plaintes et dénonciations traitées par le Conseil de la HABG](#).

HABG. 2026. [Lutte contre la corruption: la HABG affiche des résultats solides et annonce de nouvelles réforme](#).

HABG. No date a. [La Déclaration de Patrimoine](#).

HABG. No date b. [Bibliothèque](#).

HABG. No date c. [Qui sommes-nous](#).

IACA. No date. [Parties and Signatories](#).

IMF. 2023. [Côte d'Ivoire: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes—FATF Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism](#).

IMF. 2025. [Côte d'Ivoire: Fostering Economic Transformation and Adapting to Climate Change](#). IMF News.

IMF. 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire: Sixth Review Under the Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility and the Arrangement Under the Extended Credit Facility, and Fifth Review Under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility Arrangement-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Côte d'Ivoire](#).

In Cote D'Ivoire. 2025. [Improving Public Procurement Management: Government Establishes ARCOP to Replace ANRMP](#).

International Budget Partnership (IBP). 2024. [Côte d'Ivoire. Open Budget Survey 2023](#).

International Crisis Group. 2025. [An Electoral Puzzle: Handling Côte d'Ivoire's High-risk Poll](#).

International Republican Institute (IRI). 2025. [Statement of Findings and Recommendations IRI Pre-Election Assessment Mission to Côte d'Ivoire](#).

ITA. 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire Country Commercial Guide](#).

Jeannin, M. 2025a. [En Côte d'Ivoire, des conflits fonciers sur fond d'accusations de corruption et de querelle de droits](#). Le Monde Afrique. 5 March.

Jeannin, M. 2025b. [Côte d'Ivoire : l'ancien chef de la police antidrogue du port d'Abidjan détournait de la cocaïne](#). Le Monde Afrique. 7 March.

Karlen, R., Rougeaux, S. and Johansson De Silva, S. 2023. [From Market Stalls to Mechanic Shops: Better Jobs for Côte d'Ivoire's Urban Youth](#). World Bank Blogs. World Bank.

K. Cyprien (C.K.). 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire : un adjudant condamné à cinq ans de prison pour extorsion de 5 000 FCFA](#). Abidjan.net. 10 June.

Kautcha, D. 2026. [Cote d'Ivoire: Présumé détournement de 39 milliards FCFA aux Impôts, des agents mis aux arrêts?](#)

Koaci. 2026a. [Côte d'Ivoire : Affaire de détournement de 134 millions FCFA du PTUA, l'ex-responsable financier écope de 10 ans de prison ferme et ses biens confisqués](#).

Koaci. 2026b. [Côte d'Ivoire : Scandale présumé au Tribunal de Danané, le greffier en chef accusé de faire payer 35 000 FCFA pour un RCCM au lieu de 15 000 FCFA](#). 20 August.

Konan, A. S. 2018. [Côte d'Ivoire : retour sur le scandale de la fraude à l'immatriculation des véhicules](#). Jeuneafrique. 4 May.

Kouambla, J. 2026. [Corruption et foncier en Côte d'Ivoire : une défaillance du système de communication de la gouvernance foncière](#). Revue Internationale de la Recherche Scientifique (Revue-IRS), Vol. 4(4): 6602-6617.

Krippahl, C. 2020. [Ivory Coast Race Takes Dangerous Turn](#). Deutsche Welle. 14 October.

Mackintosh, T. 2025. [Main Opposition Leader Removed from Ivory Coast Electoral List](#). BBC. 22 April.

MAPS. 2024. [Assessment of Cote D'Ivoire Public Procurement System \(in French\)](#).

Mkhize-Malebo, T. and Cilliers, J. 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire Development Futures](#). ISS African Futures.

Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget. No date a [Inspection générale des finances](#).

Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget. No date b. [Présentation](#).

Ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme. No date. [Journée portes ouvertes du Pôle pénal économique et financier / Une institution fermement engagée dans la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et la criminalité organisée](#).

Mundt, R. J., Lawler, N. E. and Comhaire, J. L. 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire](#). Encyclopedia Britannica, 14 August.

N'Guessan, D. No date. [Le Pôle Pénal Économique et Financier - Côte d'Ivoire](#). Loidici.com.

N'Guessan, P. 2023. [Lutte contre la corruption : Les enquêteurs de la Habg interpellent six agents de la Drena de Yamoussoukro](#). Fratmat. 6 April.

Niada, A. 2021. [Lutte contre la corruption :Le gouvernement en guerre contre les pots-de-vin dans la douane](#). L'avenir.ci. 29 October.

OCCRP. 2022. [Glencore Ordered to Pay £280M for Bribery Scandal Across Africa](#). 4 November.

OGP. 2018. [Promote Access to Public Information Act \(CIO011\)](#).

OGP. 2025a. [In Côte d'Ivoire, A United Front Against Corruption](#).

OGP. 2025b. [Côte d'Ivoire Action Plan Review 2024-2026](#).

Portail Officiel du Gouvernement De Cote d'Ivoire. No date. [The State General Inspectorate](#).

PPLAAF. 2024. [Ivory Coast](#).

Reuters. 2025. [Ivory Coast Court Strikes Thiam's Name off Electoral Roll over French Nationality](#). 22 April.

RFI. 2021. [Un pot-de-vin contre des soins, un fléau quotidien en Côte d'Ivoire](#). 10 December.

RSF. 2026. [Côte d'Ivoire](#).

Ségorbah Silwé, K. and Koné, J. 2017. [Les Ivoiriens demeurent insatisfaits de la lutte des autorités contre la corruption](#). Dépêche No. 167. Afrobarometer.

Serious Fraud Office (SFO). 2022. [Glencore to pay £280 million for 'highly corrosive' and 'endemic' corruption](#).

Sylvestre-Treiner, A. 2025. In Côte d'Ivoire, [Alassane Ouattara Wins a Fourth Term, Marking the Twilight of His Rule](#). Le Monde. 28 October.

Swinkels, R. et al. 2026. [Sustaining “les Éléphants” Economic Prowess and Renewing Côte d’Ivoire’s Growth Model](#). World Bank Blogs. World Bank.

Tasci, U. N. 2020. [Ivory Coast's President Granted Permission to Run for Third Term in Office](#). TRTWorld. 15 September

Transparency International. 2021. [Côte d’Ivoire – A Snapshot of its Journey against Corruption](#).

Transparency International. 2026a. [Corruption Perceptions Index. Côte d’Ivoire](#).

Transparency International. 2026b. [CPI 2025: Findings and insights](#).

TV5Monde. 2020. [Côte d'Ivoire : Guillaume Soro condamné à 20 ans de prison](#).

UN. 2026. [Implementation Review Group Seventeenth Session Vienna, 18–22 May 2026 Item 4 of the Provisional Agenda* State of Implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption](#). Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption.

University of Notre Dame. No date. [Ouagadougou Political Agreement \(OPA\)](#). Peace Accords Matrix.

UN Treaty Collection. No date. [12. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime](#).

UNODC. No date. [Country profile. Côte d’Ivoire](#).

US Department of State. 2024. [2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Côte d’Ivoire](#).

US Department of State. 2026. [2025 Investment Climate Statements: Côte d’Ivoire](#).

VOA Afrique. 2018. [Le parquet enquête sur "des dizaines de milliards" détournés en Côte d'Ivoire](#). 14 September.

Wannenwetsch, S. and Young, L. 2024. [Engaging the private sector in Collective Action against corruption](#). Edition 2. Focus on Africa. Basel Institute on Governance.

World Bank. 2025a. [Tax Revenues Are Catalyst for More Inclusive Growth in Côte d'Ivoire](#). Press Release.

World Bank. 2025b. [The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Revised Methodology for Measuring Governance Using Perception Data](#).

World Bank. 2026. [Enterprise Surveys Indicator Descriptions](#).

World Bank. No date a. [Population, Total - Cote d'Ivoire](#).

World Bank. No date b. [Overview: Côte d’Ivoire](#).

World Bank. No date c. [Metadata Glossary](#).

World Bank. No date d. [Economies - Formal Sector Enterprise Surveys](#).

Disclaimer

All views in this text are the author(s)', and may differ from the U4 partner agencies' policies.

Creative commons

This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0

International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)



Corruption erodes sustainable and inclusive development. It is both a political and technical challenge. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4) works to understand and counter corruption worldwide.

U4 is part of the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), an independent development research institute in Norway.

www.u4.no

u4@cmi.no

U4 partner agencies

German Corporation for International Cooperation – GIZ

German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ

Global Affairs Canada

Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark / Danish International Development Assistance – Danida

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC

UK Aid – Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office