

# ANTI-CORRUPTION HELPDESK

PROVIDING ON-DEMAND RESEARCH TO HELP FIGHT CORRUPTION

## INVESTIGATING CORRUPTION: GOOD PRACTICES IN SPECIALISED LAW ENFORCEMENT

### QUERY

Can you provide information on international standards/requirements and best practices with regard to criminal repression of corruption concerning, in particular, the status, powers, composition, rules of appointment of managerial and operational staff, as well as the average financial, human and material/technical resources (taking, for a comparative perspective, small countries with populations between two and five million people) in criminal investigation bodies involved in the fight against corruption?

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**Date:** 6 November 2014

### SUMMARY

An appropriate response to corruption requires credible, timely and reliable investigations. Detecting corruption and collecting the necessary evidence for an effective trial is therefore a key step in the fight against corruption. As such, international and regional standards have underscored the importance of establishing specialised law enforcement bodies to investigate corruption. The types of bodies tasked with such responsibility vary from country to country. They can include a dedicated unit within the police or the public prosecutor's office, or a fully independent body.

Irrespective of the type, their effectiveness and success in corruption investigation depends on: their de facto independence and autonomy to carry out their tasks; the existence of clear and fair rules regarding the appointment and dismissal of directors and other senior posts; fair hiring processes for law enforcement officials; independence in investigations (clear mandate, identification of functions and competence); the provision of adequate resources; and the existence of measures to hold the body to account.

## 1. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND TYPES OF SPECIALISED CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION BODIES

### Overview

Several international standards and guidelines call for the specialisation of law enforcement bodies tasked to investigate corruption. For instance, article 36 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires signatory countries to ensure the existence of a body or persons specialised in combating corruption through law enforcement.

Similarly, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention states in article 20 that: “each party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against corruption” with the aim of improving both the specialisation and the independence of persons or entities in charge of curbing corruption.

The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution 97 (24) on the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight against Corruption, in particular principles 3 and 7, call for the establishment of a specialised, independent, well-trained and adequately resourced body to fight corruption.

The European Partners against Corruption (EPAC) also established common standards and best practices for bodies responsible for corruption prevention, investigation and/or prosecution that sets out the main principles to be followed, such as independence, autonomy and accountability. These standards are discussed below (EPAC 2008).

### Why establish a specialised law enforcement body?

The rationale for establishing specialised law enforcement bodies lies in the fact that the detection of corruption requires specific expertise, knowledge and skills that are often scattered across different public bodies (law, finance, engineering, accounting, among others), as well as easier access to special investigative powers and techniques. Within this framework, specialisation allows the government to

be better equipped to investigate corruption (OECD 2013a).

Law enforcement specialisation has also been used to demonstrate a government’s commitment to fighting corruption in a given country. However, in many cases, these are only window dressing initiatives that do not necessarily result in better detection and investigation of corruption cases.

### Types of specialised law enforcement bodies

In response to the above mentioned recommendations, several countries across the world have established specialised bodies responsible for conducting investigations on corruption. However, the type of body tasked with this responsibility varies from country to country.

In some countries the police are responsible for carrying out this task, in others, specialised anti-corruption agencies (also called multi-purpose bodies) conduct investigations. Some countries have created specialised units within the public prosecutor's office which employs their own corruption investigators or judiciary police (OECD 2013b).

For example, in Croatia, corruption is investigated by both a specialised police and specialised investigators within the prosecution service. The specialised unit within the police, the National Police Office for Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (PN-USKOK), was established in 2009 to support the investigation of corruption cases. The office supports the work of the specialised prosecution body, which not only coordinates the investigations but has its own investigators working on corruption cases. In Indonesia, this role is undertaken by an independent anti-corruption agency, and in Czech Republic by a special unit within the police.

International standards do not proscribe who or which organisation should conduct investigations on corruption, but only stress the importance of having a body/unit that works independently and has sufficient autonomy and resources to investigate corruption efficiently. In fact, according to these standards, the designation of an adequate number of individuals

with expertise within existing structures would already meet the requirement without having to establish a new, dedicated institutional entity, but its effectiveness would depend on the degree of independence and resources assigned to the law enforcement body (OECD 2013b).

Similarly, the analysis of the different models adopted across the world and good practice examples show that there is no one-size-fits-all approach when it comes to establishing specialised corruption law enforcement bodies. Their effectiveness and efficiency in investigating corruption – be it a unit within the police or a fully autonomous body set up for this purpose – depends on a series of other factors, including a well-defined legal status and mandate, independence in investigations, technical and financial resources, and on the country's general political willingness to fight corruption.

Overall, the decision regarding the type of law enforcement body to be established depends on the local context and should take into consideration the following factors:

- integrity and autonomy of existing institutions: the decision on the type of body to be established should take into account the status of existing bodies. For instance, in many countries, the police is highly centralised, hierarchical and reports directly to the Minister of Justice, which increases the opportunity of undue influence or interference in the investigation of corruption cases, even if indirectly (for example, there may be discretion in the allocation of financial and human resources for a specific investigation) (OECD 2013b). In others, a specialised unit that is set up within an institution that already enjoys more autonomy, such as the prosecutor's office, could benefit from that. In cases where the police and the office of the prosecutor are not autonomous, the fight against corruption could benefit from the establishment of a new body, with more power and willingness to detect and curb corruption.
- legal framework: careful analysis of the country's legal framework and its criminal justice system is also fundamental to ensure that the competence of different bodies does not overlap. Also, in some countries, creating a new independent body is not easy, requiring changes in the constitution.
- available financial resources: establishing a new institution requires significant financial investment (new building, personnel, computer systems and technology, among others). Therefore, a clear analysis of the cost-benefit of setting up a new institution versus creating an autonomous unit within an existing body should be undertaken.

The next section discusses the main principles and standards necessary for an effective corruption investigation body, with country examples<sup>1</sup>.

## 2. EFFECTIVE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIVE BODIES: TOWARDS GOOD PRACTICE

There are no universal rules that guarantee that investigations into corruption are conducted effectively. Nevertheless, there is a consensus among international organisations and experts that a set of standards and principles should be in place to ensure that law enforcement bodies act in the public interest, detect corruption, and produce sufficient and credible evidence to be used in administrative and criminal proceedings.

These standards and principles include guarantees of independence, autonomy, measures to hold these bodies to account, clear rules regarding the hiring, promotion and removal of law enforcement officials from office, and sufficient resources, among others. Within this framework, irrespective of the type of law enforcement body adopted, the following issues should be taken into consideration and provided by law (OECD 2013a; 2013b; EPAC 2008):

### Independence

Independence and autonomy are considered essential so that investigators can undertake their tasks free from undue pressure and influence, and without the need for prior consultation or approval from superiors or other public bodies (EPAC 2012; OECD 2013b).

International and regional standards underscore the importance of guaranteeing that law enforcement

<sup>1</sup> For more references and a practical assessment of bodies in Bulgaria, Romania and Spain, see a previous Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer "Anti-Corruption Specialisation: Law Enforcement and Courts".



bodies specialised in corruption investigations are independent and autonomous in the exercise of their functions (article 36 of the UNCAC; Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Art. 20; Council of Europe Resolution (97) 24, Art. 3. EPAC Declarations 2004-2001).

Beyond formal independence, the literature and previous experience shows that *de facto* independence of law enforcement bodies depends to a great extent on (i) adequate legal status; (ii) clear and fair rules regarding the appointment and dismissal of directors and other senior officials; (iii) clear recruitment procedures for investigators and other staff; (iv) independence in investigations (clear mandate, identification of functions and competence); (v) the provision of adequate resources; and (vi) confidentiality, among others (EPAC/EACN 10 Guiding Principles and Parameters on the Notion of Independence).

### *Legal status*

It is fundamental that specialised law enforcement bodies operate in an environment where the rule of law is respected. It is also key that its establishment is based on a proper and stable legal framework, such as a provision in the country's constitution or in a special law, in order to ensure its permanence and reduce the possibility of the body being shut down for political reasons.

### *Appointments and dismissals of senior staff*

There should exist clear appointment criteria for the post of head of the specialised law enforcement body to ensure their independence, impartiality, apolitical stance and competence (Transparency International 2014). Such criteria could be related to professional qualifications, reputation, previous work experience and leadership skills, among others (OECD 2013b).

Some countries have also opted for having a collegial body rather than an individual person heading the specialised unit or body. This is the case in Indonesia, where the country's anti-corruption body, that also has powers to investigate corruption, is led by a board of five individuals (Grossmann 2014).

Preferably, these positions should be advertised openly. In the case of direct appointment, it should be avoided that a single decision-maker (for example, the

prime minister) makes the decision as this could lead to undue influence. It is desirable that direct appointments are made by different levels of decision-making bodies (for example, a ministerial commission with the approval of parliament (OECD 2013b).

The term of office of the head of the anti-corruption body and senior staff is also key to avoid politicisation and the removal of personnel after elections and changes in government. The EPAC thus recommends terms of office that extend beyond the legislative term, and preferably beyond two legislative periods, with one additional year per legislative term to cover for periods of political transition, without the possibility of re-appointment. Therefore, a total term of office of approximately 12 years is considered good practice (EPAC 2012).

There should also be clear rules and safeguards to avoid that heads of anti-corruption bodies are unjustifiably removed from office.

In Austria, the Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAK) subordinated to the Federal Ministry of the Interior is the body specialised in police investigations of cases related to corruption. The bureau has to follow the general rules of the public administration (Act on the Advertising of Vacancies), which contains detailed provisions regarding the appointment of senior-level public officials and heads of units. According to the act, all managerial appointments to an organisational unit must be advertised publicly. A formal written opinion on the candidates has to be given by a board of review and then submitted to the interior minister for the final decision (EPAC 2008).

In Latvia, the head of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) is appointed by parliament upon the recommendation of the Cabinet of Ministers for a period of five years. The Cabinet of Ministers can (but is not obliged) to have an open competition process for this position; this happened for instance in 2004, when 20 applicants applied for the position and a commission comprised of the prime minister, representatives of state institutions and one non-governmental organisation selected the best candidate (EPAC 2008). Other senior officials are hired by the head of the bureau.

In Spain, the head of the specialised corruption investigation unit within the public prosecutor's office

is appointed by the government based on the suggestion of the prosecutor general (and the prosecutor general is appointed and removed from office by the king of Spain). Similarly, all of the unit's prosecutors are appointed by the government, based on a proposal from the prosecutor general and consultations with the Prosecutor General Council. There are no formal qualification requirements, but appointed prosecutors usually have expertise in economic crime and tax fraud (OECD 2013b). Prosecutors can only be removed from office by the prosecutor general following disciplinary proceedings.

#### *Investigators' and other staff's recruitment, remuneration and career prospects*

While international standards do not have specific provisions on the hiring of public officials at specialised law enforcement agencies, article 7 of the UNCAC stresses the importance of each member state to "adopt, maintain and strengthen systems for the recruitment, hiring, retention, promotion and retirement of civil servants ... that are based on the principles of efficiency, transparency and objective criteria such as merit, equity, and aptitude". The convention also stipulates the promotion of education and training to enable officials to properly perform their functions.

The EPAC independence standards also highlight the importance of having clear and transparent job descriptions and an open, transparent and reasonably timed advertising process without loopholes.

Mechanisms should also be provided with regard to reasonable terms of office, protection against undue dismissal, and undue displacement, as well as subsequent career development (EPAC 2012; OECD 2013b).

Moreover, to ensure that the specialised corruption investigation body functions effectively, an appropriate number of staff receiving adequate remuneration is essential. Salaries should be competitive with other similar institutions and in line with the country's economic development level in order to attract and retain qualified candidates.

#### *Independence in investigations: clear mandate,*

#### *identification of functions and competence*

In order to avoid ambiguities and uncertainties that could lead to undue influence in the investigation process, the law should provide for a clear description of the activities to be performed by the specialised unit as well as a detailed description of the crimes which fall under its jurisdiction. Some specialised units have jurisdiction over all corruption-related crimes, others may have jurisdiction over crimes involving high-ranking officials. The unit's competence may also be defined based on the financial value of the offence, or even share its jurisdiction with another body.

In Spain, the [Special Prosecutor's Office against Corruption and Organised Crime](#) (ACPO) is responsible for investigating and prosecuting high-level bribery and corruption-related offences. The office's statute defines the criteria to be followed by the prosecutor general to direct cases to the office. As such, corruption cases involving high-level public officials of the national, provincial, local and autonomous administration, offences committed by a low-level official, but considered complex or of economic and social importance, as well as offences committed by organised criminal groups should be investigated and prosecuted by the special office.

In Romania, the law defines that the National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA) can only start investigations on cases where the value of the bribe paid is higher than €100,000, when the offence relates to European Union funds, or if the offence is committed by elected and high-level officials, judges, prosecutors, police officers as well as custom officials. All other corruption cases are investigated by the country's police.

#### **Adequate technical and financial resources**

The effectiveness of specialised law enforcement bodies depends to a great extent on the human, technical and financial resources allocated to these bodies. Against this background, the UNCAC, the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention and the Council of Europe Resolution stresses the importance of providing the bodies responsible for corruption investigation with adequate material resources and specialised staff.

### Human resources

Specialised law enforcement bodies should be provided with a sufficient number of investigators and specialised staff to be able to effectively detect and investigate corruption (article 36 UNCAC).

The number of investigators and their remuneration depends, however, on the complexity and extent of their work. Some specialised bodies are responsible for investigating a wide range of corruption cases; others have a narrower scope of activities, focusing on high-level corruption cases but with higher degrees of complexity. Specialised law enforcement bodies may also accumulate other functions, such as international cooperation, prevention, training, or even prosecution and therefore require more staff. All these factors have to be taken into account when defining the number of staff to be hired and their remuneration.

For instance, the number of staff working in specialised law enforcement bodies in Europe varies quite significantly. In the Czech Republic, the police unit responsible for investigating corruption and financial crimes as well as providing training and recommendations has 445 staff. The Polish Central Anti-Corruption Bureau, responsible for both investigation and prosecution of corruption, has approximately 880 staff. In Lithuania, on the other hand, as of December 2012, the Special Investigative Service had 235 officials: 146 working on pre-trial investigation and criminal prosecution, 23 working on prevention, 5 working on anti-corruption education and awareness raising and the other 61 working on functions of administration (Special Investigative Service 2012). In Romania, the National Anti-Corruption Directorate responsible for the investigation and prosecution of certain types of corruption has 538 staff, out of which 168 are police officers, 53 experts and 135 prosecutors.

### Financial resources

The timely, planned and reliable provision of a sufficient budget is crucial for the success of the law enforcement body. Many specialised law enforcement bodies do not have their own budget, but have their activities financed by the overall budget of the Ministry of the Interior or the prosecutor's office, for example. More autonomy on the allocation of the budget may also give the law

enforcement body more autonomy to conduct investigations and plan expenditures according to their actual needs. Moreover, transparency in budget allocation, including detailed information broken down into the main categories of expenditure, such as on personnel, training, and information and communication technology, among others, may help to hold such bodies to account. Presenting the body's budget as a percentage of the central government's budget may also help to make comparisons and assess the government's commitments and investments in relation to other government priorities and/or other countries.

The level of funding depends on the work conducted by the law enforcement body (for instance, investigative work only or also prevention and prosecution), financial situation of the country. It is, therefore, difficult to set a benchmark. In addition to more qualitative assessments to determine whether the funds are sufficient, the analysis of the budget overtime (whether it has decreased or increased significantly), salary or staff cuts, among others, are considered good proxy indicators of the country's commitment to detect and investigate corruption cases (EPAC 2012).

In Lithuania, the budget of the Special Investigative Service is planned and negotiated independently from other state bodies and is presented on a separate line of the state budget (Pocius no year), giving in theory more autonomy to the body. Nevertheless, in the past, reductions in the state budget also translated to reductions in the budget of the agency, leading to a reduction in salaries, dismissals of employees, and less training, posing challenges to the body's effective work (Special Investigative Service 2012; 2013). In 2008, LTL 26 million (approximately €7 million) was allocated from the state budget, in 2013 the budget was reduced to LTL 19 million (approximately €5 million) (Special Investigative Service 2013; 2008), which represents approximately 0.114 per cent of the country's GDP. Information on the budget per category of expenditure is also available in the body's annual report.

In Latvia, the Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) is responsible for drafting its own budget. The budget has increased from LVL 1.66 million (€2 million) in 2003 to LVL 3.49 million (close to €5 million) in 2007 (EPAC

2008) and back to €4 million in 2014, which represents 1.34 per cent of the country's GDP (Anti-Corruption Authorities 2014).

In Spain, the unit is financed through the budget of the State Prosecution Service by the Ministry of Justice and it does not have its own annual budget or any earmarked funds (OECD 2013b), making it difficult to assess the budget. However, according to the government, a process to singularise the funds allocated to the prosecution service has started (Council of Europe 2012).

Many of these specialised agencies also receive significant financial and technical support from foreign funding.

### *Technical capacity*

International and regional standards also underscore the importance of having law enforcement officers with the necessary technical expertise to deal with complex corruption cases, including financial investigations. Within this framework, article 36 of the UNCAC and the Council of Europe Resolution requires member parties to regularly provide training. Specialised bodies should also be able to rely on external expertise, including from other countries, in specific cases.

In Romania, staff of the National Anti-Corruption Directorate receive regular training from the Romanian National Institute of Magistracy and other anti-corruption specialists in accordance to their needs. The European Union also provides conducts several training to staff and specialists working at the directorate (OECD 2013b).

## **Investigation of corruption**

### *Cooperation between national authorities*

International standards call for enhanced cooperation among law enforcement bodies and other government agencies in investigating corruption (UNCAC article 5 and 38; Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention Art 21). Enhanced cooperation can take place through joint operations and obligations to exchange information.

This is particularly relevant when different government bodies play a role in the fight against

corruption. For instance, it is crucial that the agency responsible for collecting and verifying asset declarations informs corruption-related investigations. Similarly, supreme audit institutions and other administrative bodies dealing with ethical issues should cooperate with the specialised law enforcement agencies. In addition, public agencies and other law enforcement bodies should inform specialised units of alleged corruption cases which fall within their jurisdiction.

Specialised law enforcement bodies should also be granted access to key administrative information that can help to assess whether or not an individual is involved in corruption. This includes access to bank information, data from customs and tax authorities, data from property registries and vehicle ownership, among others. For instance, the new Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, established in October 2014, has legal power to demand any type of information from other law enforcement bodies and government agencies considered to be of relevance for its investigations.

In Spain, the unit can access the tax inspectorate database containing information on tax returns and bank accounts of all individuals and private entities in the country. In addition, the unit may also access other relevant information held by other public and law enforcement bodies (OECD 2013b).

### *Effective means for gathering information*

Successful litigation on corruption depends on solid evidence. Therefore, law enforcement bodies investigating corruption need access to special investigative techniques to be able to detect as well as collect timely and reliable evidence (ARD USAID 2005). Article 50 of UNCAC recommends state parties to take the necessary measures to allow law enforcement bodies to have access to special investigative techniques such as undercover operations, electronic surveillance, among others, ensuring also that those are admitted in court. Powers to search and seize assets can also be given. Similar provisions are found in the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (article 23) and in the Council of Europe Resolution (97) Art. 3.

Many of the countries where specialised law enforcement bodies exist have granted them access



to special investigative techniques. Nevertheless, the ease with which investigators can make use of those varies. In some countries, corruption investigation bodies are required to consult a judge or another body prior to conducting surveillance or undercover operations. Depending on the circumstances, this could hamper confidentiality or even open the doors to undue influence.

In Slovakia, investigations of corruption-related cases are carried out by the Bureau of the Fight against Corruption of the Presidium of the Police Force, a specialised anti-corruption unit of the police. The bureau is supervised by the public prosecutor's office, and special investigative techniques, such as surveillance, access to bank secrets data, and non-residential searches require its approval (OECD 2013b).

In Romania, judicial police officers and specialists within the National Anti-Corruption Directorate may use a wide range of special investigative techniques, including interceptions, undercover investigations, access to financial data and monitoring of financial transactions, among others to investigate corruption cases falling within the jurisdiction of the directorate. Employees have also been trained to conduct searches using specialised hardware and software tools (OECD 2013b).

### Confidentiality of investigations and protection of witnesses

The Council of Europe guiding principles for the fight against corruption establishes, among other things, the necessity to take effective measures to ensure that law enforcement officials preserve the confidentiality of investigations.

Preserving the confidentiality of the investigations is important not only to preserve the anonymity of witnesses and whistleblowers, as required by the UNCAC (article 32 and 33), but also to avoid undue influence by other government branches, members of the political elite or other interested parties potentially involved in the case (EPAC 2008).

### Accountability

In establishing a specialised law enforcement body to investigate corruption, attention should also be taken to create a set of accountability measures. These are

critical to prevent abuses as well as to ensure credibility and enhance public trust in the new body (EPAC 2008). Accountability measures usually include rules to strengthen integrity and to prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the body, such as the existence of a code of conduct and requirements for senior officials to declare their assets and potential conflicts of interest. There should also exist an independent body to deal with complaints against members of the law enforcement agency.

Other accountability measures include requirements for the body to regularly report on their work to parliament or other government institutions. It is also key that these reports, as well as general reports on the body's activities, are available online to the general public, including information on budget, number of staff, number of investigations launched and completed, among others.

In Lithuania, the Special Investigative Service publishes its annual report online, containing detailed information on budget expenditures, human resources management as well as investigations conducted.

In Slovakia, the police force has undergone significant changes in recent years and the quality and relevance of the information on their activities available to the public has improved. Nevertheless, there are still several shortcomings related to transparency and accountability: there is very little information available regarding the steps taken in the appointment and dismissal of law enforcement agents and senior staff and there is limited oversight over the activities of the police once there is no independent body responsible for receiving and investigating complaints (Transparency International Slovakia 2012).



## 3. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED SPECIALISED LAW ENFORCEMENT BODIES

Country	Law enforcement body specialised in corruption investigation	Year of establishment	Subordinated to	Main tasks and functions	Number of staff	Annual budget
Austria	Federal Bureau of Anti-Corruption (BAK)	2010	Federal Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of cases of corruption and abuse of authority</li> <li>- corruption prevention and training</li> <li>- international cooperation</li> </ul>	120 (55 investigators)	2013: €7 million
Bulgaria	State Agency for National Security (SANS)	2008	Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption involving high-level public officials, organised crime, money laundering and terrorism</li> </ul>	n/a	2014: €5.7 million  2013: €4.3 million
Czech Republic	Unit for Combating Corruption and Financial Crime (UOKFK)	1991	Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption and financial crimes</li> <li>- training</li> <li>- crime prevention</li> </ul>	445	The unit does not have a separate budget.
Estonia	Corruption Crimes Bureau of Central Police and Border Guard Board	2012	Director General Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- criminal investigation in corruption cases and abuse of public office</li> <li>- coordination of anti-corruption policies</li> </ul>	35	The unit does not have a separate budget.

Latvia	Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB)	2002	Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption cases</li> <li>- corruption prevention and training</li> <li>- recommendation and consultative powers</li> </ul>	140 (25 investigators)	2014: €4 million 2013: €5 million
Lithuania	Special Investigation Service (STT)	1997	President and parliament	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption (intelligence activities and pre-trial investigation)</li> <li>- anti-corruption training and education</li> </ul>	240 (approx. 135 investigators)	2012: €5 million
Netherlands	National Anti-Corruption Service	1897	Ministry of Security and Justice and reports to the Board of Procurator General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption involving police officials, members of the judiciary and prominent public office-holders as well as cases of foreign bribery</li> <li>- recommendation and consultative powers</li> </ul>	135	2002: €7 million
Poland	Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA)	2006	Prime Minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption</li> <li>- prosecution of corruption</li> <li>- monitoring of asset and conflict of interest declarations</li> <li>- corruption prevention</li> </ul>	880	2011: €28 million

Romania	National Anti-Corruption Directorate (DNA)	2002	General Prosecutor's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption involving high-level public officials and all public officials when the amount of bribe exceeds a certain amount or involves funds from the European Union</li> <li>- supervision and control of criminal investigations carried out by the judicial police</li> <li>- prosecution of the above mentioned corruption cases</li> </ul>	538 staff (168 police officers, 53 experts, 135 prosecutors)	2011: €17 million
Slovakia	National Anti-Corruption Unit	2004	Police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- investigation of corruption</li> <li>- criminal analysis and documentation powers</li> <li>- execution of preventive and suppressive actions</li> </ul>	115	The unit does not have a separate budget.

Sources: The EPAC/EACN Contact Catalogue: [http://www.epac.at/downloads/info-materials/doc\\_download/108-contact-catalogue-2014-september](http://www.epac.at/downloads/info-materials/doc_download/108-contact-catalogue-2014-september)  
 Anti-Corruption Authorities' country profiles: <https://www.acauthorities.org/content/country-profiles>  
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