Anti-Corruption Helpdesk Answer

Sustainability of anti-corruption interventions and reforms

Author(s): Iva Parvanova
Reviewer(s): Gabriela Camacho, Caitlin Maslen and Vlora Rechica (TI)
Date: May 2026

Impact and institutional survival of anti-corruption interventions do not always go hand in hand. An anti-corruption reform can survive institutionally without sustaining its impact on corruption, just as a reduction in corruption can sometimes outlast the reform that produced it. The sustainability of different anti-corruption interventions and programmes is highly context dependent, as various design and implementation factors can impact sustainability. For example, reforms backed by a broad coalition of actors with actual power to act - courts, legislators, auditors - or that create new constituencies with a material stake in their survival, outlast reforms resting on a single champion or a narrow base of popular support. Funding diversity, legal or constitutional entrenchment, and a pre-planned exit strategy further shape how well that survival holds. External conditions matter for sustainability as well. Baseline state capacity to convert detection into credible enforcement and politically opportune timing, and the strength of the local civil society sector, among others, can determine the sustainability of interventions.

This paper is financed by the Swedish Postcode Lottery Foundation.

Query

What factors, conditions, and intervention types are associated with the long-term sustainability of anti-corruption interventions and reforms? Are there any good (or bad) examples that illustrate this?

Main points

- This Helpdesk answer identifies several intervention types with documented evidence on sustainability, including auditing and monitoring, transparency initiatives, awareness-raising, capacity building, digital citizen empowerment, procurement reforms, civil service reforms, and the introduction of specialised investigative bodies.

- While most evaluations reviewed treat them interchangeably, sustainability has two dimensions worth tracking separately: whether the institution, law or programme itself survives (policy sustainability), and whether the impact on corruption persists once support ends (impact sustainability). Though they often go together (impact on corruption persists because the institution continues to operate), there are cases where the institution can survive, but its effects do not, and cases in which changes in social values and norms can outlast the institution that created them.

- Evidence on sustainability is mechanism- and context-dependent: in the studies reviewed here, auditing backed by credible enforcement shows the most consistent impact, and creating local ownership is key for donor-funded interventions.

- Design and implementation factors affect sustainability, such as coalition breadth, creating new stakeholders with a material interest in the reform, funding diversity, the mode of institutional change and embedding an exit strategy.

- Baseline state capacity, political support and timing, media coverage and partnerships and staff turnover further determine whether the intervention is sustainable.

Contents

Introduction

Anti-corruption programming within policy and practice seeks to reduce the incidence and harm of corruption in all its forms (Trivunovic 2025). To do so, various domestic and international stakeholders, from national governments to bilateral donor organisations, multilateral development banks and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) invest and implement a wide range of anti-corruption interventions. These include, for example, supporting the creation and capacity building of anti-corruption agencies, audit institutions and law enforcement bodies as well as funding e-procurement platforms, whistleblowing hotlines, civil society monitoring among others (Persson et al 2013). However, a recent review of anti-corruption interventions studies found that there is limited recent evidence on their level of effectiveness (Maslen and Bergin 2026).

Interventions should be evaluated beyond their short-term effectiveness, as evidence-based and “value for money” programme planning requires considering long-term sustainability as well (Stern 2015). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) has developed an evaluation framework designed to address this directly when evaluating development-funded interventions. Of the six criteria OECD-DAC uses to assess development interventions - relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability - sustainability specifically asks whether an intervention’s net benefits continue, or are likely to continue, once support ends (OECD 2019).

Evaluating the sustainability of anti-corruption reforms and programmes poses a challenge that is sharper than in other areas of development programming and public policy. Evaluation efforts run into the complexity and hidden nature of corruption itself, the political sensitivity of the topic, and the capacity of corrupt networks to adapt to various interventions which target their activities (Dávid-Barrett et al 2020). Each of these complicates not just measuring but ensuring sustainability overall. It can be difficult for evaluators to track whether a hidden practice has ceased or adapted (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2020).

Two aspects of sustainability

Two different things can be sustained over time, but they do not necessarily move together. An intervention or reform can be upscaled or institutionalised, while also not leading to a real reduction in corruption. This can happen as interventions create opportunities for corrupt agents elsewhere in the system or as corrupt agents adapt (Olken and Pande 2012).

For example, Italy's 1992 "Clean Hands" investigations sharply increased accountability for national deputies and involved people at such high levels that it would eventually lead to the collapse of Italy’s political system (Scalia 2024). These investigations revealed extensive corruption across the entire political and bureaucratic apparatus and led to the arrest and prosecution of leading politicians, civil servants and prominent businessmen in Milan (Berengo et al 2026; Woodhouse 2022). Nevertheless, in the very same electoral districts, corruption among local public officials rose significantly, as local bureaucrats stepped into the vacuum created by exposed deputies (Woodhouse 2022). Similarly, a study on a procurement reform in World Bank-funded development aid tenders across the world showed that narrow discretion in one part of a tendering process led to government buyers routing more contracts through the non-competitive procedures, thus adapting to the newly created conditions and exploiting areas not targeted by the reform (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2020). The study ultimately found that these tactics largely cancelled out the positive effects of the reform (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2020).

On the other hand, but less observed in practice, changes in attitudes or social norms might persist after a reform has been rolled back. Some evidence demonstrates that training workshops have sustained impact on how personnel behaves and the relationships between staff in various governmental agencies, even if the capacity building was a one-off and did not get scaled-up or institutionalised (Johnsøn et al. 2016). This was the case of anti-money laundering workshops in Tanzania, which were found useful by the participants, who then went on not only to apply what they learned (leading to a conviction) but also shared the materials with their colleagues despite no formalised process for this (Johnsøn et al. 2016).

Drawing on the OECD-DAC framework, there are two channels which are necessary to consider when assessing the sustainability of an intervention. The framework defines sustainability as the "extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue or are likely to continue" (OECD 2023:59). To address this, the OECD-DAC framework further necessitates the assessment of "financial, economic, social, environmental, and institutional capacities of the systems needed to sustain net benefits over time" (OECD 2023:59). Therefore, a comprehensive sustainability evaluation would include an examination of (1) the continued benefits, i.e. sustained impact and (2) the institutions and capacities which may help sustain this impact. The wider academic public policy literature categorises these as:

- Policy sustainability - whether the institution, law or programme survives and keeps functioning as intended. It fails when a reform is formally reversed, or, more insidiously, when it is instrumentalised to potentially benefit corrupt actors[1] (Patashnik 2003).
- Impact sustainability - whether the actual outcome persists, in this case whether corruption levels remain lower over time (Schreier 2005). This aspect is substantially harder to measure (Wathen 2022). It typically fails not through

[1] For example, Romania's National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) was required by the EU for the country's accession and built a record of independent prosecutions in the years after its inception. However, in the decade to follow, it was turned into a "political weapon for those in power to use against their opponents" (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018, abstract). This includes the use of surveillance campaigns (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018) and increased scrutiny against political opponents of those in government (Henry Jackson Society 2017).

> dramatic collapse but through attenuation. Corrupt actors adapt by substituting channels the reform did not address for those it did. (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2020).

The impact generated by a policy or intervention can outlast it, especially when the intervention changes something self-reinforcing – for example social norms, or the incentives facing politicians (Bicchieri 2017, Erlich and Gans-Morse 2026). Impact sustainability is therefore best understood as whether the impact on corruption, i.e. the net benefit of the intervention, persists once the intervention is scaled back or removed, or if it is donor-funded, once the funding stops.

This Helpdesk answer will discuss both types of sustainability as most evaluations reviewed here do not always treat them separately. Due to the complexity of the topic, different evaluations have focused on different outcomes. This review relies on different measures as per the identified evaluations. Some consider the scaling up of interventions while others discuss the long-term net benefits of intervention in terms of corruption.

Why long-term sustainability is hard to assess

Limited systematic evidence, data availability and follow-up

To assess sustainability of anti-corruption interventions, evaluators require robust and long-lasting monitoring and data collection which is not always available (Shipley 2024). This is further compounded by corruption's own characteristics as a policy object - it is secretive and opaque making it hard to measure (Wathne 2022).

From the donor side, a review of anti-corruption in fragile settings shows that evaluation documents detailing challenges, lessons learned and determinants of failure are rarely published in a systematic or accessible way (GIZ 2020). Norad's evaluation of two decades of Norwegian anti-corruption assistance found a lack of global, sector- and country-level evaluation strategies, and no shared definition of anti-corruption, which makes sustainability difficult to evaluate (Vaillant et al. 2020).

Similarly, a structured review of 91 anti-corruption evaluations across eleven donors and NGOs found that most lacked the baseline data, outcome indicators or contextual analysis needed for a robust evaluation (Shipley 2024). While the academic literature has randomised control trials and experimental interventions which show some short-term impact (see for example Olken 2007; Callen and Long 2015; Muralidharan et al 2016), in general the literature lacks follow-up evidence on the potential sustainability of such one-off interventions.

Another complexity in establishing the sustainability of anti-corruption interventions is the lack of robust data needed to assess it (Wathne 2022). Interventions are often designed and implemented without embedded baseline data collection mechanisms, creating challenges for future evaluations (Shipley 2024).

Baseline data - quantitative or qualitative - captures the levels of corruption-related outcomes before the start of an intervention, e.g. experiences with or attitudes toward corruption in preceding years (Doig et al 2005:81). In its absence, evaluators can use surveys to ask respondents to recall changes in their experiences or attitudes compared to a fixed time in the past, creating potential biases (Shipley 2024:30; Parvanova and Lagarde 2025). Without a genuine baseline, isolating an intervention's effect on corruption-related outcomes becomes correspondingly harder - a problem for impact evaluation as well as assessing long-term sustainability (Hanna et al 2011; Johnsøn 2012).

Moreover, unlike institutional and governance reforms which are long-term goals, most donor-funded interventions are tied to shorter-term project cycles (Johnsøn 2012). Typically, an initial evaluation of the effectiveness of an intervention is conducted at the end of the project, but there are fewer evaluations and studies conducted further down the line, which means we lack information on their sustainability. Additionally, especially in the case of donor-funded programmes, there are often no embedded mechanisms designed to track whether recommendations from the evaluations have been implemented (Wathne 2022).

Attribution

Corruption levels, perceptions and attitudes are shaped simultaneously by macroeconomic conditions, political transitions, media coverage and shifts in global enforcement. Therefore, attributing a sustained change to a specific reform driven by a programme, especially years later after the intervention was first implemented, is difficult (Hart 2019).

Both in the case of donor-funded or domestic government programmes, multiple institutions might be targeting the same target unit and multiple forces might bring about change (Wathne 2022:19) which makes it even more difficult to attribute particular effects to one specific intervention (Dávid-Barrett et al 2020). This multiplicity of actors can also have negative effects. For example, an evaluation of anti-corruption programming in Uzbekistan found that the lack of external coherence, i.e., the presence of various externally funded anti-corruption projects with no coordination, hampers progress in the field through duplicated efforts, poor resource utilisation, and fragmentation (Gulakova 2023: 22).

Even when attribution is possible at the point of treatment, for example with randomised controlled trials primarily used in academic research, the same study may not be able to track subjects long enough to speak to its sustainability (Hart 2019). Conversely, using administrative (e.g., the public procurement Corruption Risk Indicator (Fazekas and Kocsis 2020) and perception-based data (e.g. the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2026)), which is available for longer periods of time, might be limited in linking interventions to the observed outcome causally (Congressional Research Service 2020).

Intervention types associated with long-term sustainability

Identifying relevant interventions and evaluations

This section discusses a number of evaluations and programmes assessed across the academic and policy literature. This is not meant as an exhaustive review and instead relies on two selection criteria to illustrate the issue of sustainability in anti-corruption interventions. Firstly, only evaluations published by peer-reviewed journals and credible organisations in the field were considered. Secondly, the author considered the extent to which these aligned with the topic of long-term sustainability. Initially, platforms such as Google and Google Scholar as well as the UNODC evaluation report repository were searched.

Then, a reference tracking approach was adopted to identify further relevant studies or programmes. Throughout the search process, a clear evidence gap on the long-term sustainability of anti-corruption interventions and policies emerged. The academic evaluation literature has a particular focus on experimental methods which often have no follow-up mechanisms. The grey literature, similarly, exhibited a lack of systematic evaluation evidence. Both the reviewed academic papers and grey literature focused more on effectiveness (whether the intervention is achieving the objectives it was set out to achieve) and impact (whether the intervention is actually making a difference). This section reviews overall design types – standalone programmes vs hybrid ones – and provides a typology of interventions identified in the literature. However, since not all the information presented by the literature pertained to sustainability, the section will also cover some key features of interventions that have shown effectiveness and impact, when they have potential for sustainability.

Externally funded and government-led interventions

Donor- and government-led anti-corruption programmes are not simply funded differently - they often generate different bodies of evidence about their own sustainability. International organisations, donors and NGOs have to often demonstrate accountability and evaluate their interventions. Often, donor-funded projects are mandated to have end of project evaluations and are often judged against clear metrics, such as the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria.

The review identified that international organisations, such as the UNDP and UNODC, often apply the OECD-DAC framework in their evaluations (United Nations Development Programme, 2009; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2022). While evidence around sustainability might not be substantial, evaluators reflect on potential challenges that might impede long-term results.

On the other hand, domestic interventions do not have an external funder requiring ex-post evaluations to assess the intervention. While governments may choose to do so or have offices in charge of evaluating different public policies, they normally do not have an external formal requirement to do so. Just over a third of OECD member countries, where capacity of data collection and performance tracking is likely well developed, conduct evaluations of their anti-corruption and integrity programmes (OECD 2026). An exception to this was the multifaceted "*Preventing Corruption through Effective, Accountable and Transparent Governance Institutions"* initiative in Uzbekistan. This evaluation was entirely funded by the local government (UNDP and UNODC provided technical support during the implementation of the initiative) (Gulakova 2023). The initiative then underwent a rigorous evaluation similar to many externally-led ones (Gulakova 2023).

Other domestic reforms, such as the introduction of specific laws or reforms, tend to be at the centre of academic research on effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Examples include a municipal audit programme in Brazil and India's Right to Information Act or procurement reforms, both discussed in detail below. They offer research setups and available administrative data that economists and political scientists find tractable - a random audit lottery (Ferraz and Finan 2008), a long administrative panel (Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018), a clean before/after discontinuity (RaaG and NCPRI 2009). Even in this case, sustainability is rarely evaluated directly in academic studies (Gans-Morse et al 2018). In the cases identified in this Helpdesk answer, donor and development agency-led interventions provide the overwhelming evidence stemming from anti-corruption and integrity mechanisms, while evidence in high-income countries in Western Europe and North America is limited. The availability of evidence on sustainability is, therefore, not well distributed across settings.

Intervention types

The intervention types listed here are not representative of all anti-corruption initiatives or programmes. However, certain types of intervention emerged during the search of sustainability evidence, although this is an illustrative rather than an exhaustive list. The following types found in the reviewed cases are categorised as follows:

- Auditing and monitoring (e.g., Brazil's municipality auditing programme and EU Integrity pacts)
- Transparency initiatives (e.g., Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and India's Right to Information Act)
- Awareness raising campaigns and youth engagement (e.g., UNDP's "Universities Against Corruption" initiative)
- Capacity building (e.g, SIDA's support of Burkina Faso's Superior Authority of State Control)
- Digital citizen empowerment (e.g., Phones against corruption, Kallxo)

- Procurement reforms (e.g., Prozorro, South Korea's Government e-Procurement System, World Bank procurement reform)
- Establishing investigative, monitoring bodies and anti-corruption agencies (e.g., Guatemala's CICIG, Lebanon's anti-corruption strategy and agency)

These are not completely independent. For example, some auditing initiatives also included a transparency component, such as openly publicising information revealed during the audit. However, the main underlying mechanism has been used to group them into each type. Moreover, evaluations of longer donor-led anti-corruption programmes present multifaceted interventions which often involve various stakeholders. For example, USAID's work in Haiti described below includes youth and journalist engagement as well as capacity building of specialised personnel of investigative institutions (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016).

Both interventions initiated by domestic governments and donor and multilateral organisations are included in the review. While these interventions often rely on similar mechanisms, their sustainability is affected by design and external factors differently. As such, this distinction will be expanded upon in the following sections.

Evidence on sustainability and case studies

Auditing and monitoring

Auditing and information dissemination are a long-standing example of anti-corruption programmes which have the potential to show sustained effects over time (Funk and Owen 2020; Mugellini et al 2021). One well-documented intervention is the Brazilian municipal audit programme which was driven by domestic stakeholders following the creation of the Office of Comptroller-General (Barzelay and Seabra 2026). The *Programmea de Fiscalização por Sorteios Públicos* (or Monitoring Programme with Public Lotteries), consists of random audits of municipalities for their use of federal funds. It originally started with the audit of 26 randomly selected municipalities across different states but then shortly moved toward auditing 60 municipalities chosen by lottery (Ferraz and Finan 2008). Importantly, the results of these public audits are made publicly available. Since the inception of the programme in 2003, several studies have confirmed its sustained effect across various outcomes, documenting for example an 8% corruption reduction in municipalities audited in the past (Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Funk and Owen 2020).

It has been documented that the information disclosure about detected corruption cases is linked to a lower likelihood of incumbent re-election across election cycles (Ferraz and Finan 2008). Moreover, the municipalities which received an audit in the past sustained lower levels of corruption over time, as measured by administrative and procedural irregularities, compared to non-audited ones (Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018). This is consistent with politicians having internalised a permanently higher expected probability of detection rather than simply responding to continued audit pressure. Funk and Owen (2020) also find that going through an audit or neighbouring a municipality that did, results in better quality of provided services in the future. They demonstrate the long-lasting impact of anticipation of an audit, as well as the opportunities to learn from municipalities audited in previous years (Funk and Owen 2020).

Another example of a monitoring initiative is provided by Integrity Pacts (IPs). IPs are an anti-corruption tool combining independent civil society monitoring, public disclosure and contractual enforcement, developed and promoted internationally by Transparency International (Aceves 2022). One of the most rigorously documented applications is the EU-funded Integrity Pacts project (Pring, Mulcahy and Olaya 2022). The project ran from 2016 to 2022 across 11 countries monitoring 18 public procurement projects. Each pact bound the contracting authority and all bidders to a public non-corruption commitment, with sanctions such as blacklisting or contract termination written directly into the tender, while an independent monitor oversees the process from design through implementation and reports its findings publicly (Pring, Mulcahy and Olaya 2022). Evidence of its sustainability has been context-dependent, but the programme was internalised and scaled up in Czechia following the successful implementation of the Transparency International-led pilot (Pring, Mulcahy and Olaya 2022).

Transparency initiatives

Transparency initiatives, both national and international, have demonstrated mixed results in the short-term (Maslen and Bergin 2026). Similarly, their long-term sustainability (in terms of impact and policy) has been context dependent.

An international example of a transparency initiative is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Members of EITI have to abide by transparency standards and maintain a public feedback mechanism, compliance with which is audited regularly (Sovacool et al. 2016). Participating in EITI was found to reduce corruption in Zambia short-term, as measured by the CPI and the World Governance Indicators' Control of Corruption Index, but the effect dissipates in the longer-term (Villar and Papyrakis 2017). However, it is not possible to directly attribute changes in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) or the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) to EITI interventions. These indices capture a broad range of factors, including perceptions of public sector corruption and governance, which are influenced by numerous dynamics beyond the scope of EITI activities.

The authors found two structural gaps - the lack of independent authority to enforce company-level reporting compliance and no formal process to follow up on reconciliation-report discrepancies. Similar results have been found across counties (Papyrakis et al 2017). On the other hand, Villar (2022) finds a causal positive link between EITI membership and reductions in corruption levels (as measured by a Bayesian Corruption Indicator) in the short and long term (between 2002 and 2017), especially among member countries which are compliant with the programme's transparency disclosure standards.

An older example of a reform which was led by domestic actors rather than international and donor organisations, is the Right to Information Act in India. India's RTI Act (2005) offers a domestically led counterpart to EITI's donor-anchored model, and a different sustainability profile entirely. Where EITI's sustainability erodes through an external enforcement gap - no independent authority compelling company-level compliance - the RTI Act was self-enforcing from the outset (Association for Democratic Reforms 2025; Jenkins and Goetz 1999; PRS Legislative Research 2019), making its sustainability more likely.

Awareness raising campaigns and youth engagement

The UNDP supported a regional project on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in Arab Countries (ACIAC). The project included an initiative transforming the educational system called "Universities Against Corruption" (Iovu 2025:9). The initiative built on the sporadic and fragmented youth engagement in anti-corruption across participating countries. The programme reached 2000 students across 27 universities by updating curricula to include anti-corruption content (Iovu 2025:48). This led to the emergence of regional youth networks which further advocated for legal transparency improvement (Iovu 2025:56). The evaluation found that the regional platform was able to amplify local advocacy efforts (Iovu 2025:46)

Another example of a donor-led programme utilising training and awareness raising is the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Promoting Proactive Transparency and Accountability Project (2010-2016) in Haiti. It illustrates some of the long-term limitations of such interventions (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016). The project created civil society watchdog networks, organised workshops for journalists and public awareness campaigns were aired on a community radio station. However, by 2016 the watchdog groups had dissipated, and journalists and citizens were not engaging with the wider activities of the project (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016), showing the programme's lack of sustainability.

Capacity building

Improving the overall levels of awareness about anti-corruption, among the institutional stakeholders, has been a central tool in anti-corruption programmeming. This can, for example, take the form of information and educational campaigns, providing specialised courses for investigators and prosecutors.

For example, a UNODC intervention in Nigeria provided capacity building and training to anti-corruption agency staff members. An evaluation of the project concluded that the newly gained skills, organisational principles and processes showed sustained improvements in the agency's functioning (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017). Moreover, what underpinned the sustainability of the intervention was the extended period of over two months during which agencies had a full-time external mentor – an expert in the field – who could assess the specific needs of the agency and tailor the capacity building approach to help address them (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017:35).

An evaluation of the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA)'s support of Burkina Faso's Superior Authority of State Control found similar evidence. SIDA's capacity building and training session of State Controllers were seen as particularly sustainable (Bisiaux et al 2022:43). Rather than one-off sessions, the training lasted over several months and the evaluation found it had built the State Controllers' capacities, which in turn led to more professional reports. Notably, the training took place in the field rather than in a controlled environment allowing participants to apply the coaching in practice (Bisiaux et al 2022:43). The strengthening of internal expertise was considered key for the sustainability of the project's achievements (Bisiaux et al 2022:vii).

The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) also adopted capacity building in its anti-corruption intervention in Tanzania. Following the adoption of an anti-money-laundering law, DFID led workshops for law enforcement staff and members of private sector companies exposed to money laundering risks (Johnsøn et al 2016). While the evaluation was conducted briefly after the end of the programme, it reports that the number of money laundering cases detected in the years following the workshop had increased due to what enforcement personnel learned about the problem, and to the relationships created between reporting entities and FIU staff in the workshop (Johnsøn et al. 2016:58). Another aspect of the DFID project was organising workshops for officers from auditing organisations. Participants reported improved understanding of different types of investigations. However, the lack of established knowledge sharing mechanisms within auditing organisations precluded the dispersion of new information and training materials (Johnsøn et al. 2016:37).

Digital citizen empowerment

Citizen empowerment initiatives have also taken advantage of technological uptake. For example, Phones against Corruption is an initiative by the Department of Finance with the support of UNDP in Papua New Guinea and established in 2014 (Observatory for Public Sector Innovation 2017). The tool was initiated by the Department of Finance after observing how potential negative social consequences deterred the open reporting of misconduct (Ambos et al 2018). The tool, developed in collaboration with a local telecommunications company, allows citizens to send text messages to an independent phone number which is managed by the telecommunications company. Texts are then encrypted and anonymised and forwarded as case numbers to the Department of Finance. By 2018, the Department of Finance had done additional fundraising to address structural implementation challenges and was collaborating with 43 other governmental agencies to scale up the initiative (Ambos et al 2018:17-18). Additionally, the initiative has also supported the uncovering of 500 corruption cases within 4 years of its the inception (Walton 2023).

Other digital initiatives have showed context-dependent results in the long-term. For example, the platform "*I paid a bribe"* created by a domestic civil-society organisation has demonstrated sustainability in India since 2010 (Knowledge at Wharton 2011).

However, Kubbe et al (2025) compare how the platform performed in other settings, like China, where it was closed a few months after launching due to lacking civil society and its misuse as a defamation tool (Kubbe et al 2025).

Another example is seen in Kallxo, a donor-supported platform working in partnership with domestic outlet Internews Kosova, which has operated since 2012. Citizens submit reports directly through the platform and verified cases are forwarded to prosecutorial authorities (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). Between July 2020 and June 2022 alone, the platform received 2,795 citizen reports and submitted 65 cases to the authorities, contributing to the prosecution of two former ministers, two mayors, and more than thirty police officers, among others (Loshi and Haskuka 2022:24). In the same period the follower base of the platform reached 400,000 members of the public (Loshi and Haskuka 2022).

However, not all citizen complaint platforms have demonstrated sustainability. Cambodia's Yobol.org platform, developed by the Department of Finance with support from UNDP and the innovation agency Nesta, similarly allows citizens to submit complaints for institutional follow-up (Novović and Chun 2025). Unlike Kallxo, however, the evaluation assessed the platform as having a low likelihood of continuation, attributing this to thinning civil society presence and the lack of a funded institutional home for moderating and triaging incoming reports (Novović and Chun 2025). A different failure pattern is evident in Honduras, where a citizen complaint mechanism was implemented, but its operational protocols were never formally approved (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026). The system ceased entirely when the incoming government dissolved its host ministry (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026).

Procurement reforms

High-quality procurement data is increasingly available, providing a fertile ground for long-term impact and sustainability evaluations of procurement-related interventions (Adam and Fazekas 2021). Reforms in the sector can take various forms - from e-procurement which makes data publicly available to reforms targeting favouritism directly.

E-procurement built on open data and civil-society co-design has a strong policy sustainability record where feedback constituencies are deliberately created, as Ukraine's Prozorro demonstrates (Niewiadomska 2025). Initially developed by government and civil society representatives with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) between 2014 and 2016, Prozorro is an e-public procurement portal (Yukins and Kelman 2022). Between 2017 and 2021 alone it had helped save Ukraine over 6 billion USD (White House 2021). While there is no one unique evaluation of the sustainability of the platform, there is demonstrated evidence of its impact on procurement outcomes such as cost and competition (Kovalchuk, Kenny and Snyder 2019). In particular, Prozorro is now providing information to other integrity tools for recovery spending, such as

DREAM2 (Open Contracting Partnership 2023). These indicators speak mostly to Prozorro's policy sustainability rather than its impact sustainability directly.

When it comes to impact sustainability of procurement reforms targeting corruption risks directly, evidence is mixed. Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020), studying a World Bank-mandated procurement reform across more than 100 countries, found that limiting officials' discretion and widening competition in one part of the tendering process produced real gains - fewer single-bidder tenders (falling from 22.4% to 18.7% of contracts), more bidders per contract (rising from 4.5 to 5.0), and fewer repeat winners (falling from 71.8% to 65.4%). However, government buyers partially offset these gains by shifting contracts toward non-competitive procedures excluded from the reform, which then became even more concentrated among single bidders than before (rising from 67% to 81%). This suggests that a procurement reform's sustainability depends on ensuring a holistic monitoring approach engaging various aspects of the tendering process. Turning back to Prozorro, sustainability would be ensured by Dozorro and Ukraine's anti-corruption enforcement bodies actively closing off specific loopholes corrupt actors might exploit (Niewiadomska 2025).

Even earlier than this, in 2002, South Korea developed an e-procurement system, Government e-Procurement System (GePS), in order to curb high levels of corruption in the public tendering process (World Bank 2004). The system has significantly reduced corruption and non-competitive practices (Schopf 2011). An additional platform, Korea Online E-Procurement System (KONEPS) and 'Fingerprint Recognition e-Bidding', collects data on contractors, including any previous sanctions imposed on a company (OECD 2011). The reform has been coupled with an additional integrity measure to ensure its long-term impact sustainability. The civil service has introduced a staff rotation principle in order for public officials not to be attached to specific contracts for long periods of time, which risks developing connections and creates potential for favouritism (OECD 2016).

Civil Service reform

When the Tanzania Revenue Authority was created in the 1990s to replace a systemically corrupt tax administration, reformers paired higher wages for remaining staff with the mass dismissal of implicated officers (Fjeldstad 2002). The reform produced a sharp drop in corruption and a corresponding rise in tax revenue. Wage increases could not outcompete bribery where demand for corrupt services remained high and lack of monitoring enabled this further (Fjeldstad 2002). However, there was a clear issue of revolving doors. Dismissed corrupt officers were recruited to the private sector using their inside knowledge to strengthen rather than sever those same corruption networks from outside (Fjeldstad 2002). This further illustrates that reforms can leave channels open for corrupt actors that adapt to their new circumstances and exploit them.

[2] Digital Reconstruction Ecosystem for Accountable Management

Another mass dismissal campaign took place following the Rose Revolution in 2003. Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs underwent substantial anti-corruption reforms supported by the European Commission, OSCE and USAID (di Puppo 2010). One of the biggest crackdowns was the firing of over 16,000 officers from the Ministry (di Puppo 2010). Remaining members of the traffic police, often perceived as the most corrupt part of the institution, received a wage increase as a way of disincentivising bribe taking.

Georgia's 2004 police reform illustrates both the power and the limits of displacement. Dismissing roughly 85% of the force and rebuilding it from scratch produced a durable collapse in petty bribery - citizen-reported bribe incidence fell from near-universal to around 2% by 2015 (Centre for Public Impact 2016) demonstrating the sustained impact of the reform. However, elite and political corruption persisted, democratic backsliding followed, and the absence of a broad coalition meant the reform left the security sector structurally dependent on executive control rather than independent accountability (Devine 2023). It is therefore a partial success rather than a success: petty corruption outcomes were sustained over a longer period of time, but there was no spill-over impact on high-level corruption persisted.

Establishing investigative, monitoring bodies and anti-corruption agencies

Law enforcement and investigative bodies sometimes lack the operational capacity or independence to effectively pursue anti-corruption. In response, some anti-corruption strategies involve the creation of a dedicated unit within the domestic justice system or of an internationally-supported commission operating alongside it. Guatemala's *Comisión Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala* (or the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala, CICIG) (2007-2019) is an example of the creation of an internationally-supported investigative body. CICIG had cultivated considerable civil society backing over its twelve years of operation and was, by 2017, one of the most trusted public institutions in Guatemala (Zechmeister and Azpuru 2017).

It had achieved measurable and long-lasting impact on corruption investigations and prosecutions in the country (WOLA 2019). Nevertheless, the CICIG was dismantled in 2019 following lack of political backing (Hawkins 2021). Similar bodies were modelled after CICIG across Central America, such as the Honduras's Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH) and El Salvador's International Commission against Impunity (CICIES). Each commission followed a similar trajectory - initial investigative success and civil society backing, followed by closure once its work threatened political elites, with the decisive factor in each case being the withdrawal or absence of sustained external financial backing rather than a lack of domestic support (Hawkins 2021).

UNDP's ACIAC also initiated legal and institutional changes across Arab states. Most notably, through this project the UNDP supported the adoption of the first anti-corruption strategy in Lebanon and the subsequent establishment of Lebanon's National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (Iovu 2025). The UNDP also provided further capacity building strategies. Lastly, due to the regional nature of the project, Lebanon was able to learn from other neighbouring countries and adopt strategies on establishing political support (Iovu 2025).

Table 1: Illustrative cases of intervention types found to have positive effects on curbing corruption

Intervention type	Core mechanism	Examples discussed above	Further examples encountered in the review
Auditing and monitoring	Systematic or randomly-targeted audits of spending, combined with public disclosure and, in some models, independent civil-society monitoring with contractual sanctions	Brazil's municipal audit programme, CGU (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018; Barzelay and Seabra 2026); EU Integrity Pacts (Pring, Mulcahy and Olaya 2022)	Puerto Rico's municipal audit programme (Bobonis, Fuertes and Schwabe 2016)
Transparency initiatives	Mandated disclosure standards or statutory information rights, sometimes paired with an independent compliance mechanism	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Sovacool et al. 2016; Villar and Papyrakis 2017; Villar 2022); India's Right to Information Act (Jenkins and Goetz 1999; RaaG and NCPRI 2009)	Other national right-to-information laws showing a similar self-enforcing dynamic, where design (not the disclosure requirement alone) determines whether it holds
Awareness-raising campaigns	Public information campaigns and civil-society or youth engagement to build a broad culture of anti-corruption awareness	UNDP's ACIAC "Universities Against Corruption" initiative, (Iovu 2025); USAID's PPTAP, Haiti (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016)	Uzbekistan's PCEAT awareness contests and CSO advocacy grants (Gulakova 2023)
Capacity building	Training for investigators, prosecutors or auditors, often field-based or paired with sustained mentorship	UNODC's capacity-building project, Nigeria (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017); SIDA's support to Burkina Faso's Superior Authority of State Control (Bisiaux, Sanou and Vaillant 2022); DFID's programme, Tanzania (Johnsøn et al. 2016)	Transparency International's Turning Up the Pressure anti-money-laundering training across seven ECOWAS states (Serralta 2020); UNDP's SAEK III training-of-trainers model, Kosovo

Digital citizen empowerment	Technology-enabled citizen reporting (SMS, apps) channelled to an institutional actor for follow-up	Phones against Corruption, Papua New Guinea (Ambos et al. 2018; Walton 2023); "I Paid a Bribe," India/China (Knowledge at Wharton 2011; Kubbe et al. 2025); Kallxo, Kosovo (Loshi and Haskuka 2022); Yobol.org, Cambodia (Novović and Chun 2025); Line 130, Honduras (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026)	Honduras's OUNTAH university observatory (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026);
Procurement reform	E-procurement platforms publishing tender data; rules narrowing officials' discretion in tendering	Ukraine's Prozorro/DoZorro (Niewiadomska 2025); the World Bank-mandated procurement reform (Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas 2020); South Korea's GePS/KONEPS (Schopf 2011; OECD 2011, 2016)	
Workforce replacement	Mass dismissal or replacement of implicated staff, sometimes paired with wage increases for remaining personnel	Tanzania Revenue Authority (Fjeldstad 2002); Georgia's Ministry of Internal Affairs, post-Rose Revolution (di Puppo 2010)	
Specialised investigative and prosecutorial bodies	Independent commissions, often internationally backed, created to investigate corruption the ordinary justice system can't reach	Guatemala's CICIG (Zechmeister and Azpuru 2017; WOLA 2019; Hawkins 2021); Honduras's MACCIH and El Salvador's CICIES (Hawkins 2021); Lebanon's National Anti-Corruption Commission (Iovu 2025)	Five domestic anti-corruption commissions in Africa (Doig, Williams and Watt 2005); Caribbean anti-corruption agencies (Dávid-Barrett, Murray, Polvi and Burge 2020); Jordan's Anti-Corruption Commission (Meagher 2012)

Factors and conditions that are associated with long-term sustainability of interventions

After illustrating the variety of intervention types across different settings, it is important to understand how and why these demonstrated some of the sustainability results documented over time. When reviewing the literature, a set of design factors and external conditions were identified as compounding the impact and policy sustainability of the interventions.

A working framework: within-design factors and surrounding conditions

The previous section reviewed examples of anti-corruption interventions and some sustainability outcomes they produced. This section turns from what happened in those cases to why. It explores which design choices and which surrounding conditions raise or lower the odds that an intervention's policy sustainability, impact sustainability, or both, will hold. These have been adapted from the wider political science and public policy literature.

The factors below fall into two families. Design and implementation factors are choices made before and during the intervention itself. These can include, for example, how it engages with the local stakeholders, what its funding model is, how it engages with donors and funders if such exist and whether those have planned their exit strategy. External conditions sit outside the intervention control. These include, for instance, the capacity of the institutions it works through, the political calendar it lands in, the norms of the society it operates in, among others.

Design and implementation factors

To maximise the likelihood that an intervention will sustain its impact, sustainability needs to be integrated into its design. The review of evaluations found that this is especially true for donor-funded programmes. In the case of donor-funded programmes, it is important to establish a shared understanding of sustainability as well as a predetermined exit strategy for the donor (United Nations Development Programme 2009). The evaluation approach adopted by some organisations, such as the UNDP, goes as far as considering “UNDP’s {…] progressive disengagement” as one of the defining dimensions of sustainability (United Nations Development Programme 2017:85).

A pre-established exit strategy also often refers to establishing a funding strategy for local stakeholders after donor funding has subsided (Loshi and Haskuka 2022:8). In a review of Anti-Corruption Brigades in Peru, programmes which integrated questions around sustainability in their capacity building and design demonstrated substantially higher confidence in their ability to maintain activities and outcomes achieved through the intervention (Luft 2016: 31).

Coalition breadth and domestic ownership

A reform, once implemented, can be defended by a broad coalition of actors, such as courts, prosecutors, the legislature, audit bodies and civil society. Various evaluations have documented that identifying and supporting actors, who have incentives to push against the corrupt status quo, can improve the long-term impact of reforms (see for example, Meagher 2012:23; Congressional Research Service 2020:27). Indeed, the World Bank's own evaluative record reaches much of the same conclusions. Its Independent Evaluation Group found that reducing corruption had historically been one of the Bank's least effective areas of engagement (World Bank IEG 2011, p.4). While initially it was believed that this was due to low interest from staff members of the World Bank, the evaluation process revealed that it was in fact lack of commitment from partner countries that constrained anti-corruption efforts (World Bank IEG 2011, p.65).

For example, a reform that depends on one individual is only as durable as that person's tenure and political protection (Johnston 2014). Guatemala's International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG, discussed below), for example, supported roughly 660 prosecutions and around 400 convictions of high-level officials over 12 years (WOLA 2019). However, it built essentially no domestic constituency within the political elite (Hawkins 2021). Therefore, when the president it was investigating declined to renew the Commission’s mandate, no broad coalition existed to defend it despite immense public support (Hawkins 2021). However, only focusing on the political elites has its downsides, as the evaluation of a government-led programme in Uzbekistan found that engaging exclusively with politicians rather than stakeholders outside of the government restricted innovation, collaborations and could hinder the sustainability of the programme (Gualkova 2023).

In the case of donor-funded programmes, local stakeholders might not actually have any buy-in but instead appease the donor. This is also known as isomorphic mimicry - governments adopt the outward form of "best-practice" anti-corruption institutions to look more capable to external audiences, without building the function behind them (Andrews 2013; Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2017). An alternative would be to let local actors set the agenda, with donors supporting rather than authoring it (Jackson 2020).

To avoid this, several evaluations of such programmes cited the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness as the guiding principle of their sustainability strategy. This ensures that “provision was made for the project to assist beneficiary agencies with the development of their own strategy or development plans” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2017:36).

For example, Transparency International’s Integrity Pacts showed some mixed results, particularly due to the varying degree of domestic ownership (Pring Mulcahy and Olaya 2022). On the one hand, in Czechia contracting authorities went on to commission three new Integrity Pacts on their own initiative and financing after EU funding ended. This suggested that the monitoring approach had been internalised as standing procurement practice rather than a donor-dependent exercise (Pring, Mulcahy and Olaya 2022). Elsewhere, however, the evaluators found that continuation depended heavily on decisions by national Managing Authorities rather than on the pacts' demonstrated effectiveness, and one implementing partner anticipated that institutions will revert to their past practices within a year or two following the exit of TI (Pring Mulcahy and Olaya 2022).

Broader coalitions also can help prevent outright rollback. For instance, Brazil’s Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) shows the contrast. Its audit function was embedded across multiple institutions, given ministerial independence and had the support of various actors instead of resting on one office (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018). Therefore, when the executive branch planned to subsume it into another governmental department, there was enough pushback to ensure it maintained its independence (Dobrik 2015).

Feedback constituencies

Coalition breadth and feedback constituencies are related but distinct routes to the same protective effect and can complement each other. Coalition breadth asks whether a reform secures the backing of diverse actors who already hold institutional standing - courts, prosecutors, the legislature, audit bodies, established civil society organisations (Chene 2010). Feedback constituencies refer to whether the reform's design itself manufactures a new set of interested parties with no prior institutional standing or specific interest in anti-corruption, whose stake exists only because the reform created it (Patashnik 2003).

For example, Ukraine's Prozorro e-procurement system was built to create exactly such constituencies. Its 'Golden Partnership Triangle' consisted of three sets of actors - certified private e-commerce marketplace operators, government, and civil society - each with a functional role in running the system (Niewiadomska 2025:86). Two of these became genuine feedback constituencies rather than mere participants. The e-marketplace operators, who now compete commercially within the system they helped build, and DoZorro's civic volunteers, who monitor contracting data and report irregularities to enforcement agencies. Suppliers gained a further material stake of their own - domestic firms bidding for public contracts rose from 14,000 in 2014 to 140,000 in 2024 (Niewiadomska 2025:85). These three groups have a newly established material stake in Prozorro's continued operation. E-commerce marketplace operators in the transaction revenue generated, civil society in the transparency data that helps their monitoring role, and companies in the market access it opened up. Each of them has an incentive to defend the system against rollback. Prozorro's principle that everyone sees everything has empowered the private sector, citizens, civil society and watchdog groups to monitor government procurement decision-making (Niewiadomska 2025:88).

India's Right to Information Act (2005) shows the same mechanism operating at much larger scale and tested more rigorously. The Act created millions of active users within the general public, and its roots lie directly in a feedback-constituency dynamic, including over 400,000 unique applicants from rural areas and over 1.6 million applications from urban areas within 2 years of implementation (RaaG and NCPRI 2009:8). The Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan's campaign for access to local spending records in Rajasthan in the 1990s built the organised base that later became the National Campaign for People's Right to Information (NCPRI) which pushed the national law through (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). That constituency has organised repeatedly and successfully against attempts to dilute the Act by changing the term length of Commissioners or by using privacy concerns as a way of diluting access (PRS Legislative Research 2019, AMLegals 2025).

Diversity of funding sources

Funding diversity works much like coalition breadth, but for material rather than political backing. This is particularly relevant for donor-funded interventions. Long-term dependence on a single funder can make programmes vulnerable to shifting priorities (Chêne 2010). For example, USAID's evaluation of the PPTAP in Haiti identified the lacking diversity of funding sources as a problem as the project was financed exclusively by USAID. This left their viability threatened at project close (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016:29). By 2016 the project's civil society watchdog networks had dissipated entirely.

An evaluation of UNDP support of Kosovo’s anti-corruption programmeming similarly found that despite promising short-term effects, sustainability may be hindered by donor dependence (United Nations Development Programme Independent Evaluation Office 2025). In particular, the platform Kallxo demonstrated great promise by generating an engaged user based and having measurable impact in terms of corruption enforcement. Nevertheless, it lacked financial sustainability due to overreliance on one funding source (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). Similar digital platforms can avoid such vulnerabilities by developing robust business models which can help them reach sustainability (Loshi and Haskuka 2022).

To offset the dependence on a single funder, those leading the programme can find ways to offer value-added services to other organisations (Chêne 2010) linking back into creating feedback constituencies.

Diversity of funding sources asks whether a programme depends on one funder or several. Funder coordination refers to cases in which several funders are already present in the same country, whether they work in alignment or in parallel.

For example, Sweden, the European Union, and Switzerland pooled their support for the Burkina Faso’s anti-corruption authority through a single Extended Action Plan adopted in 2019, which institutional staff credited with avoiding duplication of effort (Bisiaux, Sanou, and Vaillant 2022:24). The World Bank funded the same institution over the same period but outside that pooled mechanism, and its support for training, study visits, and equipment overlapped with what the coordinated donors were already funding (Bisiaux, Sanou, and Vaillant 2022:25).

Honduras shows the coordinated case working at a larger scale. The project's participation in the G-16 donor coordination group is explicitly credited with preventing duplication of international aid across the country's wider anti-corruption assistance landscape (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026). Uzbekistan shows what the absence of any coordinating mechanism produces: government stakeholders themselves reported difficulty identifying which partner was funding which initiative, a fragmentation the evaluators warned could lead to duplicated effort and inefficient resource use where funding is already one of the main sustainability risks (Gulakova 2023). Pooled or aligned funding gives a reform a single, coherent base to draw on when any one donor's priorities shift, while uncoordinated funding creates vulnerabilities.

Legal or constitutional entrenchment of the founding instrument

A reform's formal legal status shapes how easily a change of government can undo it, independent of whether the reform has domestic political backing in the coalition breadth sense. Three cases sit at different points on this spectrum. Honduras's Secretariat of Transparency and Fight Against Corruption held no entrenchment beyond ordinary ministerial status. Therefore, it was easily dissolved outright, taking the National Transparency and Anti-Corruption System and the Line 130 complaint mechanism down with it in a single administrative act (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026).

Lebanon's National Anti-Corruption Commission sits one step further along. It was created by ordinary statute (Law No. 175 of 2020), which affords it more formal standing than a ministerial unit but leaves it reversible by ordinary legislative majority. Burkina Faso's Superior Authority for State Control and the Fight against Corruption sits furthest along the spectrum, holding constitutional status together with a legally mandated budget floor of 0.1% of the national budget (Bisiaux, Sanou, and Vaillant 2022). Entrenchment raises the bar against outright abolition, increasing the likelihood of sustainable reforms.

Designing with an exit strategy in mind

Multiple externally-led evaluations reviewed here have noted the importance of creating and following an exit strategy from the inception of the project (for example Novović and Chun (2025), Gulakova (2023), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2018)) or at least when there is still time to implement it (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). This design feature can be seen as a way of addressing all other design and external factors at the implementation stage of the project. A clear exit strategy can include information on budgetary needs and fundraising strategies for interventions which require additional future financing (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). Such a strategy can also map out knowledge transfer from international partners and ensure that there is a specified entity responsible for the preservation and dissemination of this information domestically (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018). Exit strategies can also guide the steps needed to ensure local ownership – either through existing coalitions or new constituencies.

External conditions

Baseline state capacity

The long-term sustainability of anti-corruption interventions is often determined by the capacity of existing institutions (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). International organisations have also recognised the inability of reforms to be sustained in the absence of operationally capable anti-corruption institutions (UNDP 2017:48). Where that downstream capacity is weak, the deterrent effect of even a technically sound intervention will be limited (UNDP 2017). Brazil's municipal audit programme shows the persistent version of this pattern. The deterrent effect of increased audit risk materialised only where sanctions were credibly likely to follow detection (Zamboni and Litschig 2018). In this case, capacity refers to a functioning prosecutorial and judicial chain behind the audit findings, not just the audits themselves. Similarly, bottom-up initiatives, such as “Kallxo”, relied on the credible possibility of enforcement (Loshi and Naskuka 2022). State capacity is also an essential aspect of retaining users and their engagement with such platforms in the long run.

Political support and elections

Timing matters because the political cost of exposed wrongdoing is not constant - it depends on how soon voters, oversight bodies, or coalition partners can act on what they learn (Bobonis et al 2016). Donors have also recognised the opportunity window that political events present for optimising and sustaining the impact of interventions (Congress 2020:27).

Elections do not only change the *cost* of exposure - they can also reset the institutional relationships an intervention depends on, regardless of what information is or isn't disclosed. In the case of USAID's PROGATI programme in Bangladesh, establishing a parliamentary budget-oversight unit came to a halt after parliamentary elections, as incoming members were unfamiliar and distrusting of the programme's objectives which created risks to the institutionalisation of the programme’s objectives (United States Agency for International Development 2011).

In addition to timing, political turnover has also been noted as potentially detrimental to the sustainability of interventions. To avoid this, the multi donor project supporting anti-corruption in Kosovo prioritised working with civil servants instead of career politicians (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). This helped the project sustain its domestic governmental support despite three cabinet changes in 2020-2021 alone (Loshi and Haskuka 2022).

Media coverage and partnerships

Interventions with a public-facing or information-disclosure component depend on media amplification to translate disclosure into political consequence; without it, information can be released without anyone acting on it. Brazil's municipal audits show this directly. The accountability effect of exposed corruption was strongest precisely where local media presence was strongest, and weakest where it was absent (Ferraz and Finan 2011). Media is also linked to political timing, as it acts as the transmission mechanism that timing operates through.

The record shows that interventions that have partnered with pre-existing, independent media institutions work better than building parallel media capacity from scratch. Kosovo's Kallxo platform was built in partnership with Internews Kosova and BIRN, established investigative outlets with their own institutional continuity - one likely contributor to Kallxo's comparatively strong sustained output relative to other digital platforms discussed above (Loshi and Naskuka 2022). By contrast, smaller ad hoc media components - such as journalistic workshops and engagements in USAID's programme in Haiti – did not enhance the role of media and journalists in creating public awareness and support for the programme (Philippe and Jean Claude 2016).

Staff turnover

Several donor-funded programmes relied at least partially on capacity building through specialised staff training (for example, Serralta (2020), Organisation for Development and Support (2021), Johnsøn (2016), Philippe and Jean-Claude (2016). When trained staff members leave the institution, the institutional memory can fade (United Nations Development Programme 2009). Training new staff members requires additional resources expanding the need for funding. As such, ensuring that there are knowledge sharing and turnover practices can help mitigate this risk.

Several externally-led anti-corruption programmes relied at least partially on capacity building through specialised staff training, and evaluators flagged staff turnover as a threat to sustaining that capacity. Transparency International's *Turning Up the Pressure* - an anti-money-laundering programme spanning seven ECOWAS countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire) - trained various stakeholders, including law enforcement, prosecutors, and Financial Intelligence Unit staff (Serralta 2020: 13). Its evaluation identified risk of knowledge loss due to trained staff turnover as a potential risk to sustainability (Serralta 2020: 21).

Some evaluations point to mitigation strategies rather than treating this purely as a risk. UNDP's SAEK III mid-term evaluation in Kosovo highlights a "training of trainers" approach explicitly designed so that knowledge is institutionalised in a training curriculum and a pool of accredited trainers rather than residing in any single individual (Loshi and Haskuka 2022). This reframes the mitigation less as a retention problem and instead focuses on retaining institutional knowledge. A similar approach was adopted in the institution strengthening project in Indonesia (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018).

Civil society ecosystem strength

Coalition breadth asks whether a specific reform is designed to engage and secure backing from civil society organisations (CSOs) already in the field. Before this, there needs to be an understanding of the civil society capacity in the setting where the intervention will be implemented. Uzbekistan's evaluators name this directly as a structural constraint – the country's limited NGO sector is a condition the project's design could not correct but has to adapt to (Gulakova 2023). In settings where the political environment is hostile towards anti-corruption CSOs, strengthening strategic relationships with any NGOs working on transparency and integrity can help improve the chances for sustainability (Organisation for Development and Support 2021:18). To overcome similar constraints, at least one project substituted an alternative broad-based partner. Honduras's programme worked through universities rather than civil society organisations for several of its co-creation and oversight functions, a workaround for a constraint rather than evidence the constraint did not bind (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026).

Fiscal and budget-cycle conditions

Baseline state capacity, as discussed above, is concerned with whether institutions have the operational and enforcement capability to make a reform's deterrent effect credible. Fiscal and budget-cycle conditions are a more concrete constraint sitting alongside it. It asks whether the state's own budget commitment, and the timing of its disbursement, materialises as planned. Burkina Faso illustrates the commitment gap. National law mandates the anti-corruption agency receive at least 0.1% of the state budget, but actual delivery has run at roughly 0.00008% (Bisiaux, Sanou, and Vaillant 2022:45).

Honduras illustrates the timing version of the same constraint. The government's own co-financing commitment, at USD 915,814 (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026:1), was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic's disruption of the national budget cycle before finally being released through reallocated ministry funds (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026:8). In both cases the state's fiscal capacity impacted how and to what extent the programme can continue to operate as intended in the long-term despite already securing political support.

What matters for each type of sustainability

The table below maps the principal factors the illustrative cases show to the dimension of sustainability they most affect, with the direction of effect and an illustrative case; entries rest on the sources cited.

Table 2 Design and contextual factors affecting the sustainability of anti-corruption reforms

Factor	Type	How could it work?	Illustrative cases
Coalition breadth and ownership	Design/implementation factor	Reforms defended by multiple institutional actors - courts, legislature, audit bodies - survive leadership turnover; those resting on a single champion or office collapse once that person loses power or protection. Broad popular support alone is not a substitute: it can raise the political cost of closure without preventing it.	CICIG collapse (Hawkins 2021; WOLA 2019) vs. Brazil CGU survival (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Avis, Ferraz and Finan 2018; Dobrik 2015); Romania's DNA (Mungiu-Pippidi 2018)
Feedback constituencies	Design/implementation factor	Reforms that create organised winners with a material stake generate their own defenders and are harder to reverse; reforms with diffuse benefits and concentrated costs on powerful losers are politically fragile.	Ukraine's Prozorro/DoZorro (Niewiadomska 2025); India's Right to Information Act (RaaG and NCPRI 2009; Jenkins and Goetz 1999)
Diversity of funding sources	Design/implementation factor	Long-term dependence on a single funder leaves a programme vulnerable when that funder's priorities shift; spreading across several funders, or building value-added services other organisations will pay for, offsets this in the same way coalition breadth offsets political dependence on one champion.	USAID's PPTAP, Haiti, single-funder dependence (Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016); Kosovo's Kallxo platform, funding overreliance (Loshi and Haskuka 2022)
Funder coordination among multiple organisations	Design/implementation factor	Where several funders are already active in a country, pooling or aligning their support avoids duplicated effort and gives a reform a coherent base to draw on; uncoordinated parallel funding creates fragmentation and inefficiency even when total resources are adequate.	Burkina Faso, pooled Extended Action Plan vs. uncoordinated World Bank funding (Bisiaux, Sanou and Vaillant 2022); Honduras, G-16 donor coordination group (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026); Uzbekistan, absence of coordination (Gulakova 2023)
Legal or constitutional entrenchment of the founding instrument	Design/implementation factor	A reform's formal legal status shapes how easily a change of government can undo it, independent of whether it has domestic political backing: ordinary ministerial status is reversible by administrative act,	Honduras's Secretariat of Transparency, dissolved by administrative act (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026); Lebanon's NACC, ordinary statute (Iovu 2025); Burkina Faso's Superior Authority,

		ordinary statute by legislative majority, and constitutional status with a mandated budget floor raises the bar against outright abolition furthest.	constitutional status (Bisiaux, Sanou and Vaillant 2022)
Designing with an exit strategy in mind	Design/implementation factor	A pre-established exit strategy - covering budgetary and fundraising needs, knowledge transfer from international partners, and a named entity responsible for preserving it domestically - addresses the other design vulnerabilities at the implementation stage rather than leaving them to be discovered at project close.	UNDP's SAEK III, Kosovo (Loshi and Haskuka 2022); institution-strengthening project, Indonesia (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018)
Baseline state capacity	External condition	Detection only deters where sanctions credibly follow, and that credibility is what lets officials internalise a permanently higher expected probability of detection rather than merely responding to continued pressure; weak courts, records systems or sanctioning bodies break that chain.	Brazil, audits + sanctions (Zamboni and Litschig 2018); bottom-up initiatives - I Paid a Bribe (Knowledge at Wharton 2011), Phones against Corruption (Ambos et al. 2018)
Electoral and political timing	External condition	The political cost of exposed wrongdoing depends on how soon accountability actors can respond. Information released ahead of an electoral or budgetary moment produces consequences that the same information released afterward does not (especially for vertical accountability).	Puerto Rico municipal audits (Bobonis, Fuertes and Schwabe 2016); Brazilian mayoral accountability (Ferraz and Finan 2008, 2011)
Media coverage and partnerships	External condition	Interventions with a public-facing or disclosure component depend on media amplification to translate disclosure into political consequence; partnering with pre-existing, independent media institutions outperforms building parallel media capacity from scratch.	Brazil's municipal audits, accountability effect strongest where local media presence was strongest (Ferraz and Finan 2011); Kosovo's Kallxo, partnership with Internews Kosova and BIRN, vs. USAID's PPTAP, Haiti, ad hoc media components (Loshi and Haskuka 2022; Philippe and Jean-Claude 2016)
Staff turnover	External condition	When trained staff leave, institutional memory and specific expertise do not automatically transfer to a	Transparency International's Turning Up the Pressure, ECOWAS states (Serralta 2020); UNDP's

		successor, and re-training imposes a recurring cost that programmes rarely budget for; training-of-trainers approaches that institutionalise knowledge in a curriculum rather than an individual mitigate this.	SAEK III training-of-trainers model, Kosovo (Loshi and Haskuka 2022)
Civil society ecosystem strength	External condition	A reform's design can create feedback constituencies only where a civil society sector exists capable of organising around them; where the sector is thin or the political environment hostile to anti-corruption CSOs, programmes have substituted other broad-based partners such as universities.	Uzbekistan, limited NGO sector as a binding structural constraint (Gulakova 2023); Honduras, universities substituted for civil society organisations (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026)
Fiscal and budget-cycle conditions	External condition	Distinct from baseline institutional capacity, this asks whether the state's own budget commitment materialises as planned and on time; a legally mandated funding floor is not self-enforcing if actual disbursement falls far short of it or is delayed by an unrelated fiscal shock.	Burkina Faso, mandated 0.1% budget floor vs. roughly 0.00008% delivered (Bisiaux, Sanou and Vaillant 2022); Honduras, government co-financing delayed by COVID-19 budget disruption (Arredondo Casillas and Velasco Sánchez 2026)

Conclusion

Two things can be sustained, and they do not always move together. Policy sustainability asks whether the institution, law or programme survives and keeps functioning as intended; impact sustainability asks whether the reduction in corruption persists once support is withdrawn. Most of the evaluations reviewed here do not separate the two, but they serve to illustrate their distinction. Guatemala's CICIG achieved sustained investigative impact but did not survive institutionally and its impact on corruption eventually eroded; Georgia's police reform sustained a collapse in petty bribery without extending its effects to high-level corruption; and the anti-money-laundering workshops in Tanzania left behind changed practice and working relationships without the training itself being institutionalised. An intervention can also survive while its effect erodes, as the EITI evidence on the dissipation of short-term gains illustrates.

This Helpdesk answer is not a systematic review: it draws on a subset of evaluations and studies in order to illustrate with concrete cases, how sustainability could play out. It is important to reiterate that sustainability, particularly years after the end of an intervention, is rarely evaluated directly. Donor-funded programmes are typically assessed at project end, and they consider sustainability as a future looking exercise, providing recommendations on how to make the project sustainable and identifying some of its strengths, but due to the moment in which they happen do not truly assess whether the results have been sustainable over time. In this sense, while some of the interventions here identified show effectiveness and impact, and potential for sustained results, the absence of follow-up assessments makes claims difficult.

However, the Helpdesk answer shows that no intervention type is inherently sustainable. The same intervention produces different outcomes in different settings: reporting platforms endured in Kosovo but closed in China, Integrity Pacts were internalised by contracting authorities in Czechia while remaining donor-dependent elsewhere. Of the identified cases in this answer, the most consistent evidence is found on auditing backed by credible enforcement, as Brazil's municipal audits have shown deterrence persisting in previously audited municipalities – though only when sanctions following detection were credible.

Support is the most important factor for institutional survival, either through utilising established coalitions or creating new constituencies. Reforms that have gained the support of diverse institutional actors willing to defend them, or reforms that have created constituencies that have a material stake in their survival have a higher chance of survival than those whose existence depends on a single champion. Brazil's Office of the Comptroller General survived an attempt to absorb it, as it had the support of various actors across multiple institutions; whereas the CICIG had public support but no support where it truly matter, within the political elite and was dismantled. Civil society support can be important, and in contexts where civil society is weak or the political environment repressive, programmes might want to create other types of feedback constituencies, for example turning to other broad-based partners such as universities.

Funding diversity, legal or constitutional entrenchment, and a pre-planned exit strategy are important determinants of how durable the effects of an intervention are once external funding or political sponsorship recedes. Baseline state capacity determines whether monitoring can be converted into enforcement. External anchors such as EU conditionality or donor pressure can sustain political will for a period, but are a complement to domestic ownership, not a substitute for it. Media partnerships that amplify disclosure, staff turnover that erodes institutional memory, and the underlying strength of the local civil society sector further condition whether that capacity and timing translate into sustained outcomes.

Finally, similar to what Shipley (2024) found, the evidence gap is partly the consequence of the programmes themselves, which usually lack baseline data collection, agreed indicators to measure sustainability and do not include in their budgets follow-up assessments for some years after the projects ends. Without a more systematic approach to baseline data collection, evaluation and sustainability, conclusions about what makes anti-corruption interventions sustainable over time will remain provisional.

References

Aceves, R.G. 2022. Integrity Pacts in the EU: Suitability, Set Up and Implementation Transparency International, Berlin.

Adam, I. and Fazekas, M.2021. Are Emerging Technologies Helping Win the Fight Against Corruption? A Review of the State of Evidence. *Information Economics and Policy* 57,

Ambos, T., Tatarinov, K., Somervilla, S., Milligan, K. 2018, Initiatives with Impact :Unleashing bottom-up innovation in International *Organisations*. University of Geneva Research Report.

Andrews, M. 2013. The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development: Changing Rules for Realistic Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Andrews, M., Pritchett, L. and Woolcock, M. 2017. Building State Capability: Evidence, Analysis, Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Arredondo Casillas, E., and Velasco Sánchez, E. 2026. *Final Independent Project Evaluation: Strengthening Corruption Prevention and Promoting Transparency in Honduras (HONAD5)*. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Avis, E., Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. 2018. Do Government Audits Reduce Corruption? Journal of Political Economy, 126(5): 1912-1964.

Barzelay, M. and Seabra, S.N., 2026. From audit to prosecution: institutional collaboration as a solution to closing the expectations gap in decentralized governance. *Financial Accountability & Management*.

Berengo, M., King, R.L., Knights, M.F., Clark, M., Powell, J.M., Marino, J.A., Signoretta, P.E., Foot, J., Palma, G.D., Nangeroni, G., Wickham, C.J., Larner, J., Lovett, C.M., Palma, G.D. 2026. Italy. Encyclopedia Britannica

Bicchieri, C. 2017. Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2017

Bisiaux, R., Sanou, B.W., and Vaillant, C. 2022. *Final Evaluation of the support contribution to the Superior Authority of State Control – fighting against corruption in Burkina Faso*. NIRAS Sweden.

Bobonis, G.J., Fuertes, L.R.C. and Schwabe, R. 2016. Monitoring corruptible politicians. American Economic Review, 106(8): 2371-2405.

Callen, M. and Long, J.D., 2015. Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *American Economic Review*, *105*(1), pp.354-381.

Centre for Public Impact. 2016. Seizing the Moment: Rebuilding Georgia's Police. London: Centre for Public Impact.

Chene, M. 2010. Mobilising broad anti-corruption coalitions. U4 Helpdesk Answer.

Congressional Research Service. 2020. Countering Corruption Through U.S.Foreign Assistance.

Dávid-Barrett, E. and Fazekas, M. 2020. Anti-corruption in aid-funded procurement: Is corruption reduced or merely displaced? World Development, 132: 105000.

Dávid-Barrett, E., Murray, A., Polvi, J. and Burge, R., 2020. Evaluating anti-corruption agencies: learning from the Caribbean. Journal of development effectiveness, 12(1), pp.74-88.

Devine, K. 2023. Democratic Police Reform, Security Sector Reform, Anti-Corruption and Spoilers: Lessons from Georgia. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 34(1).

Di Puppo, L., 2010. Police reform in Georgia. Cracks in an anti-corruption success story. *U4 Practice Insight*, *2010*(2).

Dobrik, A. 2015. Brazil's CGU keeps ministerial status. Global Investigations Review.

Doig, A., Williams, R. and Watt, D., 2005. Measuring 'success' in five African anti-corruption commissions. U4 Report 2005:1. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Michelsen Institute (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2025:32).

Erlich, A. and Gans-Morse, J. 2026. Can norm-based information campaigns reduce corruption? *American Journal of Political Science*, 70, pp.471–490.

Fazekas, M. and Kocsis, G., 2020. Uncovering high-level corruption: Cross-national objective corruption risk indicators using public procurement data. British Journal of Political Science, 50(1), pp.155–164.

Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. 2008. Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(2): 703-745.

Ferraz, C. and Finan, F. 2011. Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments. American Economic Review, 101(4): 1274-1311.

Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2002). "Fighting Fiscal Corruption: The Case of the Tanzania Revenue Authority." Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute, CMI Working Paper 2002:3.

Funk, K.D. and Owen, E., 2020. Consequences of an anti-corruption experiment for local government performance in Brazil. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 39(2), pp.444-468.

Gans-Morse, J., Borges, M., Makarin, A., Mannah-Blankson, T., Nickow, A. and Zhang, D. 2018. Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works. *World Development*, 105, pp.171–188.

Gulakova, B. 2023. *"Preventing Corruption through Effective, Accountable and Transparent Governance Institutions in Uzbekistan" Project: Final Report*. Commissioned by UNDP Uzbekistan.

Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G., Durlacher, K. 2011. The Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policy: What Has Worked, What Hasn't, and What We Don't Know - A Systematic Review.

Hart, E., 2019. Guide to using corruption measurements and analysis tools for development programmeming. U4 Guide, 1.

Hawkins, E. (2021), "Learning from the Collapse of CICIG, MACCIH, and CICIES: What Lessons for the Future?" GAB: The Global Anticorruption Blog, 29 November 2021

Henry Jackson Society. 2017. *Fighting Corruption with Con Tricks: Romania's Assault on the Rule of Law.* London: Henry Jackson Society.

Iovu, A. 2025. Final Evaluation of the Regional Project on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in Arab Countries. November 2019–June 2025.

Jackson, D. 2020. How change happens in anti-corruption: A map of policy perspectives. U4 Issue 2020:14. Bergen: CMI.

Jenkins, R. and Goetz, A.M. 1999. Accounts and accountability: theoretical implications of the right-to-information movement in India. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), pp.603–622

Johnsøn, J. 2012. Theories of change in anti-corruption work: A tool for programme design and evaluation. U4 Issue.

Johnsøn, J., Aiko, R., Messick, R., Mwombela, S., Schütte, S. and Sengu, H., 2016. *Strengthening Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Action (STACA) Programme: A Case Study Evaluation*.

Johnston, M. 2014. Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knowledge at Wharton, 2011. Janaagraha: Curbing Corruption Through Citizen Empowerment.

Kovalchuk, A., Kenny, C. and Snyder, M., 2019. Examining the Impact of E-Procurement in Ukraine. CGD Working Paper 511. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Available at:

Kubbe, I., Palifka, B.J. and Alsbirk, L.B., 2025. I Paid A Bribe"—Lessons and Insights From Crowdsourced Corruption Reporting in India. Regulation & Governance.

Loshi, K. and Haskuka, M. (2022) *Mid-term project evaluation of the support to anti-corruption efforts in Kosovo, phase III (SAEK III).*

Luft, M. 2016. *Learning Review: Anti-Corruption Brigades, Peru*. Berlin: Transparency International.

Maslen, C. and Bergin, J. 2026. What works in anti-corruption: The effectiveness of interventions. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 Helpdesk Answer 2026:8).

Meagher, P., 2012. *Evaluation of UNDP Support to the Jordan Anti-Corruption Commission: Final Report*.

Mugellini, G. et al. 2021. Public sector reforms and their impact on the level of corruption: A systematic review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 17(2): e1173.

Mungiu-Pippidi, A. 2015. The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina. 2018. Explaining Eastern Europe: Romania's Italian-Style Anticorruption Populism. *Journal of Democracy* 29 (3): 104–116.

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P. and Sukhtankar, S., 2016. Building state capacity: Evidence from biometric smartcards in India. *American Economic Review*, *106*(10), pp.2895-2929.

Novović, T. and Chun, N. 2025. *Final Evaluation of the Project for Strengthening Transparency and Accountability in Local Governance through Civic Engagement*. United Nations Development Programme

Niewiadomska, E., 2025. The impact of the Prozorro procurement system on the Ukrainian economy. *Law in Transition*, pp.83-91.

Observatory for Public Sector Innovation. 2016, eProcurement System Prozorro. *Case Study Library*.

Observatory for Public Sector Innovation. 2017. Phones against corruption.

OECD. 2011. Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in Korea.

OECD.2016. The Korean Public Procurement Service: Innovating for Effectiveness. OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris.

OECD. 2019. Better Criteria for Better Evaluation: Revized Evaluation Criteria Definitions and Principles for Use. Paris: OECD DAC Network on Development Evaluation.

OECD. 2022. Public Integrity Indicators. Paris: OECD.

OECD. 2023. Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management for Sustainable Development. 2nd edition. Paris: OECD.

Olken, B.A., 2007. Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. *Journal of political Economy*, *115*(2), pp.200-249.

Olken, B.A. and Pande, R., 2012. Corruption in developing countries. *Annu. Rev. Econ.*, *4*(1), pp.479-509.

Open Contracting Partnership. 2023. The Ukrainian DREAM: Making wartime reconstruction digital and accountable.

Organisation for Development and Support. 2021. *SHARAKA 2 Evaluation Final Report*. Berlin: Transparency International.

Papyrakis, E., Rieger, M. and Gilberthorpe, E., 2017. Corruption and the extractive industries transparency initiative. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *53*(2), pp.295-309.

Parvanova, I. and Lagarde, M., 2025. Framing of sensitive topics in surveys measuring corruption in healthcare. *Social Science & Medicine*, *364*, p.117521.

Patashnik, E. 2003. After the Public Interest Prevails: The Political Sustainability of Policy Reform. Governance, 16(2): 203-234.

Persson, A., Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J., 2013. Why anticorruption reforms fail—systemic corruption as a collective action problem. *Governance*, *26*(3), pp.449-471.

Philippe, P. and Jean-Claude, U., 2016. *Promoting Proactive Transparency & Accountability Project (PPTAP): Final Performance Evaluation Report*.

Pring, C., Mulcahy, S. and Olaya, J. (2022), End-of-Project Evaluation of Transparency International's Integrity Pacts (IP) - Civil Control Mechanism for Safeguarding EU Funds, Phase 2. Transparency International, Berlin.

RaaG and NCPRI (2009) *Safeguarding the Right to Information: Report of the People's RTI Assessment 2008*. New Delhi: RTI

Assessment & Analysis Group and National Campaign for People's Right to Information.

Scalia, V. 2024. The Clean Hands of Populism: The Paradox of the Italian "Tangentopoli". Journal of White Collar and Corporate Crime, 5(2), 105-112.

Schopf, J. C. 2011. Following the money to determine the effects of democracy on corruption: the case of Korea. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 11(1): 1-39.

Scheirer, M.A., 2005. Is sustainability possible? A review and commentary on empirical studies of programme sustainability. *American Journal of Evaluation*, *26*(3), pp.320-347.

Serralta, E. 2020. *Evaluation Report: Turning up the Pressure: Tackling Money-Laundering through Multi-Stakeholder Approaches in ECOWAS Countries*. Berlin: Transparency International

Shipley, T. 2024. Evaluating anti-corruption interventions: The state of practice. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 Issue 2024:04).

Sovacool, B.K., Walter, G., Van de Graaf, T. and Andrews, N., 2016. Energy governance, transnational rules, and the resource curse: Exploring the effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). World Development, 83, pp.179-192.

Stern, E. 2015. Impact Evaluation: A Guide for Commissioners and Managers. London: Big Lottery Fund, Bond, Comic Relief and Department for International Development.

Taylor, M.M., 2017. Lessons from Guatemala's Commission against impunity. Council on Foreign Relations.

Transparency International. 2010. Evaluation of Transparency International (independent evaluation). Berlin: Transparency International.

Transparency International, 2026. Corruption Perceptions Index 2025. Berlin: Transparency International.

Trivunovic, M. 2025. What is Anti-corruption? Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute.

United Nations Development Programme. 2009. *Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results*. New York: UNDP.

United Nations Development Programme, 2017. Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Anti-Corruption and Addressing Drivers of Corruption. UN.

United Nations Development Programme. 2025. *Independent UNDP Programme Evaluation: Kosovo*. New York: UNDP Independent Evaluation Office.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2017. *Final Independent Project Evaluation of the "Support to Anti-Corruption in Nigeria" Project (NGAX60)*. Evaluation team led by Pierre Robert. November 2017.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2018. *Final Independent Project Evaluation of "Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions in Indonesia" (INDA03)*.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2022. *Evaluation Handbook: Guidance for Designing, Conducting and Using Independent Evaluations at UNODC*. Vienna: UNODC.

United States Agency for International Development. 2011. *Audit of USAID/Bangladesh's Promoting Governance, Accountability, Transparency and Integrity (PROGATI) Programme*. Report No. 5-388-11-005-P. Washington, DC: USAID OIG.

Vaillant, C., Christensen, M., Pyman, M. Sundet, G., Smed, L.. 2020. Evaluation of Norway's Anti-Corruption Efforts as part of its Development Policy and Assistance. Report 5.NORAD.

Villar, P.F., 2022. An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) using the Bayesian corruption indicator. *Environment and Development Economics*, *27*(5), pp.414-435.

Villar, P.F. and Papyrakis, E., 2017. Evaluating the impact of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) on corruption in Zambia. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, *4*(4), pp.795-805.

Walton, G.W., 2023. Decentralisation, corruption and topological reach in Papua New Guinea. *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space*, *41*(2), pp.292-312.

Wathne, C. 2022. Effectively evaluating anti-corruption interventions: Tailoring the approach to the challenge. Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (U4 Issue 2022:6).

White House. 2021. United States Strategy on Countering Corruption.

WOLA (2019), "Fact Sheet: The CICIG's Legacy in Fighting Corruption in Guatemala," Washington Office on Latin America, 27 August 2019.

Woodhouse, E.F., 2022. Accountability and corruption displacement: evidence from Italy. *Journal of Public Policy*, *42*(4), pp.730-754.

World Bank. 2004. Korea's Move to E-Procurement. *PREMnotes*, Public Sector, No. 90, The World Bank, Washington, DC.

World Bank (IEG). 2011. World Bank Country-Level Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption. Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group.

Yukins, C.R. and Kelman, S., 2022. Overcoming Corruption and War-Lessons from Ukraine's ProZorro Procurement System. GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works.

Zamboni, Y. and Litschig, S. 2018. Audit risk and rent extraction: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, 134.

Zechmeister, E.J. and Azpuru, D., 2017. What does the public report on corruption, the CICIG, the public ministry, and the constitutional court in Guatemala. *Topical Brief. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Latin America Public Opinion Project*, pp.1-2.

Transparency International
International Secretariat
Alt-Moabit 96
10559 Berlin
Germany

Phone: +49 - 30 - 34 38 200
Fax: +49 - 30 - 34 70 39 12

tihelpdesk@transparency.org
www.transparency.org

transparency.org/en/blog
facebook.com/transparencyinternational
twitter.com/anticorruption